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Abstract
This thesis consists of three papers that investigate the labour market activity of
women following a divorce and discuss the possible causes of divorce from theoret-
ical and empirical perspectives.
One of the consequences of divorce for women with dependent children who
are not fully employed in labour market, is a major loss of income and decrease
in their well-being. For the past decades more married women became active in
labour market, however their employment choice remains an interesting question
which has been broadly addressed in the literature.
With a focus on British Households during 1991 to 2008, the first chapter
of this dissertation studies the employment rate among women who experience
divorce. At the intensive margin, findings of this chapter suggest that labour
supply increases after divorce. At the extensive margin the results suggest that
probability of working part time decreases for women who do not hold a university
degree whereas for women with a higher education degree, the probability of full
time employment increases.
The second chapter studies causes of divorce by focusing on Search and Match-
ing theoretical framework. Despite a number of studies that suggest re partnering
is the driving force of divorce, the findings of this chapter do not agree with the
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prediction of such models and instead argues that odds of separation are higher
among couples in which both spouses have low productivity levels.
Continuing the discussion of previous chapter, chapter 3 reviews the welfare
system of United Kingdom for the period of 1991 to 2008 and investigates the effect
of tax and benefit system on probability of marital dissolution. The results of this
chapter suggest that increase in benefit entitlement after divorce, to some extent
explains the observed rate of marital dissolution specially among low productive
households.
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Chapter 1
Transitions in Employment During and
After Marital Dissolution
1.1 Introduction
This chapter is a descriptive study of labour supply of married women who expe-
rience a marital dissolution. The changes in labour supply of these women during
separation period are studied at both intensive and extensive margins.
For a long period of time the dominant role for married women was to take care
of children and household tasks, while married men were the bread winners. Over
the past decades factors such as improvements in technology, introduction of con-
traceptive pills therefore decreasing the number of shut gun marriages (Greenwood
and Guner, 2009), introduction of no fault or unilateral divorce (Parkman, 1992),
drop in wage gap between men and women and increased educational opportunities
played a role in changing the traditional way of sharing household responsibilities.
During this transition more women; especially more married women became active
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in labour market.
Despite the increased involvement of married women in labour market, there
are still a considerable number of these women who specialise in home production
and family care. Upon marriage failure, these women may suffer from less compet-
itive advantages in labour market. Given that earned labour income is one of the
secure ways of insuring against poverty it is important to understand the labour
supply pattern of divorced women who compared with their male counterparts
have lower marketable skills. Apart from labour market experience, investment
in education is another path towards accumulating human capital. Therefore it
would be interesting to know whether unexperienced but educated divorced women
fare better compared with those who have lower educational qualifications.
There is a vast literature on the unidirectional causal relationship between
divorce and labour force participation. For example Johnson and Skinner(1986)
use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to find out how much of the rise in labour
supply of married women can be explained by observable changes in women’s
environment. They observe that hours of work and labour force participation rates
start increasing from three years before separation while finding little evidence for a
significant effect of labour force participation on divorce probabilities. They argue
that the rise in frequency of divorce accounts for about one-third of the increase
in women’s postwar labour force participation. In a later study Papps (2006) uses
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for the period 1979 to 2004 and
studies the effect of both marriage and divorce probabilities on labour supply. He
finds the probability of marriage to increase number of working hours for those
unmarried people who expect to marry someone with a lower wage rate and this
case is more valid for men than for women. Among married people, an increase
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in the likelihood of divorce has a positive effect on labour market participation
of those who earn less per hour than their spouses. This case is more likely to
happen for women than for men. Also Bremmer and Kesselring (2010) find strong
statistical evidence that increased probability of divorce leads to increase in female
labour force participation using a population survey which is conducted by the U.S.
Census Bureau. Considering Granger causality test they state that rising divorce
rates in the past decades caused increases in employment. Rather than defining
a causal effect this paper looks at average transition rates in employment among
women who experience a marital dissolution with a stress on the role of education.
This chapter is organised as the following: the next section provides some
stylised facts relevant to the discussion of the chapter. Data source and descriptive
statistics are presented in sections 3 to 5. Estimation of labour supply at intensive
and extensive margins are provided in section 6. The results are discussed in
section 7 and section 8 concludes.
1.2 Stylised facts
Fact 1 ; There are three facts driven from the data to be highlighted in this section.
Firstly, I will show that the percentage of women engaged in family care and
home production exceeds that of men. The second point to be stressed is the
importance of labour supply in reducing poverty of divorced women. The last
point is a discussion on the importance of this study and shows to what extent the
well being of children is linked to the labour supply of divorced women.
Figure 1.1 shows an overall picture of employment gender gap in the UK since
1971 and it can be seen that over time the inactivity gap between sexes has nar-
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Figure 1.1: Economic Inactivity by Gender
rowed but has not disappeared. This figure is extracted from an ONS social trend
report (ref) and compares the trend of inactivity among men and women aged
16 to 59, disregarding the reasons for inactivity. It would be interesting to break
down these percentages by the reasons for economic inactivity.
Figure 1.2 also extracted from ONS report, breaks down the inactive individuals
into 6 groups. As it is observed from the figures the main reason for economic
inactivity among women is family care while among men is being in full time
education. Since the long time sick, retired and full time students are not the
concern of this study in figure 1.2 I focus on the two most relevant reasons for
economic inactivity, these reasons are family care and unemployment.
Left hand side graphs in Figure 1.3 are based on a sub sample of British House-
hold Panel Survey (BHPS). This sub sample represents men and women who live
in the U.K. from 1991 to 2008 that have at one dependent child in their household.
15
Figure 1.2: Breakdown of Economic Inactivity
Most of men who are not working are unemployed whereas the unemployment rate
among women is very low, instead more than 70% of women who are not active
in labour market are in family care. The percentage of men who are out of work
because of family care has increased since 1991, but still is considerably lower than
that of women. Thus it can be concluded that it is mostly women who dedicate
their time to family care and consequently can suffer from low accumulation of
marketable human capital.
The right hand side graphs in Figure 1.3 are derived from Office of National
Statistic report. These graphs are presented to compare the sample of this study
with the national statistics. ONS report does not provide detailed economic ac-
tivities of married men and women who have or have not dependent children,
nevertheless higher rates of family care among women than men is evident from
both samples. For instance, according to the ONS report in 2008, among 25 to 34
year-old economically inactive women, 73% were engaged with family care whereas
16
Figure 1.3: Comparison between BHPS and National Survey
only 9% of men reported family care as their reason for economic inactivity. These
rates are 62% and 17% for women and men in 35 49 year-old age group.
Fact 2 ; Increase in employment is argued to be the most likely reason for re-
duction in poverty and improved well being after marital dissolution. The effect
of employment on household income for United Kingdom is discussed in details
by Jenkins (2008). He finds the reduction in adverse financial consequences of
divorce among lone mothers to be due to the increased labour market participa-
tions, specially after the introduction of Working Family Tax Credit in 1999. The
reduction in poverty rate due to higher labour supply is not only valid for divorced
17
Figure 1.4: Families With Dependent Children
women. In Part of the ONS Poverty and Employment Transitions in the UK and
EU, 2007-2012 Release, it is showed that the exit rate from poverty for people who
move to employment, specially full time employment is on average 70%. Reforms
in the UK that have been taking place since 1999 and specially the 2003 Working
Tax credit reform are aimed at alleviating poverty by promoting paid work. Thus
with decreased levels of out of work benefits and disregarding a minority group
of separating women who can rely on inheritance or unearned income after di-
vorce, for the rest of separating women labour income is the safest way of securing
themselves against poverty.
Fact 3 ; Having discussed that economic well being of divorced women is directly
linked to their labour supply, the final fact to be highlighted is that labour supply of
divorced women is a determining factor in well being of children. This is due to the
fact that a considerable proportion of children live with their separated mothers. In
a report for Employment Research Institute, Graham (2014) compares the income
18
Figure 1.5: Transition to Lone Parenthood
level of lone parents with couple families who have dependent children in their
household and she finds that lone parent families are more at risk of poverty.
Moreover as seen in figure 1.4, which is taken from General Lifestyle Survey of
Office for National Statistics around 20% of families with dependent children are
lone mothers.
In their 2014 report (Berrington 2014), Centre for Population Change, provide
a graph extracted from ONS General Lifestyle Survey 2011, that compares the
number of separated or divorced lone mother with single lone mothers (this graph
is presented in Figure 1.5). The data shows that during 1991 to 2008 about half
of women entered single motherhood through marital dissolution.
These three stylised facts complete our discussion on why it is important to look
at the labour supply of women following the marital dissolution. The next section
is a description of the data and employment trends among separating women in
19
the U.K. between 1991 to 2008.
1.3 Data
The data for this study comes from British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a
government funded survey conducted at University of Essex, Institute of Social
and Economic Research. The BHPS represents population of households living in
the UK during 1991 and 2008. The survey is repeated annually for 18 years and
each year of the survey is referred to as a wave. I have used all 18 waves of BHPS
to investigate the role of divorce on labour market participation of women aged 23
to 60.
About 30% of women aged less than 23 are full time students, this number
decreases to less than 2% for women aged more than 22. Therefore to have a
homogeneous sample, women aged less than 23 are dropped out of the sample.
Moreover the retirement age in UK is around 60 or 65, therefore in order to exclude
retired individuals from the sample I leave out women aged 60 or more from the
analysis.
Another criterion for selecting the sample of this study is marital status. Given
that I am interested in labour supply of married and divorced women only I exclude
women who are in none of the two states. Therefore the sample consists only of
married women who may or may not separate. Should they separate they remain
in the sample only if they don’t remary. The single women will be observed only
if they become married at some point during the panel and the observations of
their singlehood state will be disregarded. The sample consists of first divorces
only. Therefore if a woman remarries the information about her second marriage
20
will be disregarded.
In the original BHPS file there are eight categories to indicate marital status
and there is a difference between legal and current marital status. To determine
the marital status I focus on the current status as it is a better indication of the
household composition. To make the distinction between legal and current states
consider the case in which a woman is separated from her spouse and they no
longer live together however her legal marital status is still reported as married.
On the other hand there are women who re-partnered after a marital dissolution
and cohabit with their new partner but their legal marital status is still divorced.
Living with a new partner can provide new income sources, therefore the legal
marital status is less indicative than the current one when it comes to economic
situation of divorced women.
After applying the above filters, the final sample consists of married women
who may or may not separate or divorce during the life of the panel. Should a
woman divorce she still remains in the sample because I want to compare her
labour supply before and after divorce. The data set is an unbalanced panel of
54,596 observations which consists of 7109 individuals who are observed for at
most 18 years. Although the sample size and number of individuals are relatively
large, when it comes to the number of women for whom I observe the transition
from first marriage to first divorce, the number of divorces are narrowed down to
700 cases. For most parts of the analysis however, I look at the average behaviour
across married or separated women and I don’t limit the analysis to those 700
observed divorces. In the final discussion when I present the changes to labour
supply during divorce years, I only look at those 700 women for whom I can observe
the change in their marital status. The next section provides summary statistics
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of the data set.
1.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 presents some general descriptive statistics about age, labour market sta-
tus and educational level of the selected sample of this study. As seen in this table
observations are homogeneously spread across different age groups with the excep-
tion of 51 to 60 year-old groups. The average (as well as median) age of women
is about 42. Women aged 23 to 30 are least represented in this sample compared
to other age groups. This can be due to the average age of marriage during the
1991 to 2008 period which ranges from 29 to 34 years old. Therefore marriage is
less common among the youngest cohort, thus they are under represented in this
sample.
The variable indicating employment status is a derived variable which is com-
posed of a number of other variables found in BHPS, such as the economic status,
whether a person is in full time or part time employment, number of hours worked
per week for employees and number of hours worked per week for the self employed.
In BHPS full time work refers to 30 or more hours of work per week. Although
there is no formal definition for full time or part time work, according to the UK
government’s website, a full time worker usually works 35 hours or more per week.
I used both of these cut off points, i.e. 30 and 35 hours to distinguish between part
time and full time work in the analysis but the results do not change significantly.
For the rest of this analysis I use the BHPS definition of full time work which is
working 30 or more hours per week. Thus I compare three main labour market
states among individuals, full time, part time and not working. Non worker is
22
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Frequency
Age
23-30 12%
31-35 14%
36-40 16%
41-45 16%
46-50 16%
51-60 26%
Marital Status
Married 85%
Married and divorced 85%
Sep/Divorced 15%
Labour market status
Full-time 41%
Part-time 30%
Not employed 29%
Self-employed 0.4%
Maternity Leave 4%
Family Care 60%
Retired 11%
Sick or Disabled 14%
Unemployed 6%
Full time student 2%
Other or missing 2.6%
Education qualifications
No Education 19%
Less than O-level 9%
GCE O-leves 22%
GCE A-levels 10%
Nursing Qualification 3%
Teaching Qualification 4%
College 20%
University First Degree 11%
University Higher Degree 2%
Sample Size 54,596
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Figure 1.6: Kernel Estimate of Average Hours of Work per Week
some one who works zero hours per week, she can be out of labour market such
as a family carer or unemployed.
The Kernel distribution of average hours worked per week is presented in Figure
1.6. As observed in the graph there are 3 peaks in the distribution. The first peak
is at zero. The second peak starts at 20, and the third one is at 40 hour per week.
Full time employment is the most observed state in this sample. Most of the women
(60%) who are not working are taking care of their families. The rest of this table
is self explanatory. Table 1.1 forms a general idea about sample’s characteristics
but it is more informative to break down these statistics by marital status. In this
way, we can observe any differences in economic activity or education qualification
among divorced and married women.
In Table 1.2 the education qualification of married women who at some point
throughout the panel experience marital dissolution is compared with that of the
the control group, which are married women who remain married throughout the
24
Table 1.2: Education by Marital Status
Constantly married Eventually Divorced
No Education/Qualification 17% 21%
Less than O-level 5% 5%
GCE O-leves 22% 27%
GCE A-levels 11% 11%
College 21% 21%
Nursing Qualification 3% 3%
Teaching Qualification 3% 2%
University First Degree 13% 8%
University Higher Degree 3% 2%
Number of Observations 47,991 3,536
sample. To minimise the bias from age gap and have a more homogeneous compar-
ison, I have limited the observations represented in Table 1.2 to the women aged
26 to 50. The reason for doing so is that older cohorts tend to have lower levels
of education, therefore I excluded those aged more than 50. By age of 26 most
people have obtained their highest educational qualification, therefore those aged
less than 26 are excluded from the comparisons in Table 1.2 as well. As observed
from this table , there are no noticeable differences regarding education among
these two groups.
Table 1.3 represents economic status conditional on marital status. Divorced
women are compared with married women who have experienced a divorce and
with married women who remained married throughout the sample. First column
of this table describes women who tend to remain married at least as far as they are
observed by the data collector. Second column corresponds to married women who
experienced divorce at later stages of the survey and the last column corresponds
to divorced women. It should be noted that almost all of the divorced women are
25
Table 1.3: Economic Status Conditioned on Marital Status
Always Married Married-Divorced Divorced
Not working 29% 32% 32%
Part time 31% 30% 23%
Full time 40% 38% 45%
Number of Observations 47,991 3,536 4,559
Not working Always Married Married-Divorced Divorced
Unemployed 5% 7% 15%
Family Care 61% 67% 48%
Sick/Disabled 13% 12% 23%
Maternity Leave 4% 8% 3%
Retired 13% 2% 4%
Other 4% 4% 7%
those who were observed to be married at earlier waves, therefore the average age
of women in the second column of table 1.3 is lower than that of first and third
columns of this table. The average age for the former is 36 while for the latter i.e.
always married or divorced, is 43 - 44. Comparing second and third columns of
table 1.3 gives us an idea about the possible changes to labour supply once women
experience a marital dissolution.
Divorced women are 5% more likely to be working full time compared to women
with stable marriages and the number rises to 7% when they are compared to
married women with unstable marriages. This can imply that when women get
divorced they are more likely to be working full time. However making such a
claim needs more careful investigations.
Second part of Table 1.3 describes the economic activity of the 30% of women
who do not work, in further details. It is interesting to see that the highest rate
of unemployment is observed for divorced women. This can suggest that divorced
26
women move form economic inactivity to actively looking for a job. Given that
tax benefit policies in the UK are designed to encourage single mothers to search
of a job, this increase in unemployment rate seems to be justified.
Another noticeable difference among married and divorced women is the frac-
tion of them who are occupied with family care. Due to the age gap between
divorcees and currently married women it makes more sense to compare the per-
centage of family care among divorced women with that of constantly married
women. As observed in this table the percentage of women in family care drops
from 61% (among married women) to 48% (among divorced women).
The increase of 11% in long term sickness or disability among women who are
divorced is also noticable. Given that most of these divorced women were observed
to be married at an earlier stages in the panel, 11% change in health condition
is a considerable fraction which needs further investigations, however the focus of
this chapter is employment transition among women who are not suffering from
disability therefore explaining the higher number of disability among divorced
women is beyond the scope of the current research. I
n summary, what is learnt from Table 1.3 is that divorced women on average
are expected to be more active in labour market. It should be noted however that
once in part time or full time employment the average hours worked per week are
the same among these three groups. The average hours worked per week is 17
among part time workers and 37 among full time workers. Having these results
in mind it would be interesting to look at the average transition rates from one
employment spell to another for these three marital groups.
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1.5 Transitions in Labour Market
Blank (1994) uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for women aged
18 to 50 who are in a position to make labour supply choices. She finds past
activities in labour supply to have significant importance in predicting current
labour supply choices. She states that women who are in full time employment or
in unemployment are very persistent in their labour supply decisions whereas those
who are in part time employment change their employment status more frequently.
She finds little evidence that entering part time employment would increase the
probability of gradually moving into full time employment.
Although the main purpose of Blank’s work is not directly related to the objec-
tive of the current paper, her findings regarding instability of part time employment
is consistent with the results of this chapter. Here I apply an approach similar
to Blank (1994) and use the past labour supply information to explain current
behaviour.
Transition rates are the probability of one employment state conditional on
the previous year employment history. These probabilities can be good indication
of the persistence of each group of women in their choice of labour supply and
their tendency to move into or out of employment between any two year periods.
I look into transitions in labour market between any two consecutive years among
constantly married, temporarily married and divorced women, trying to answer
questions such as: Do we observe more mobility in labour market for women who
experience a divorce? Is the transition mostly towards higher or lower labour
supply? Therefore I compare the average transition rates of divorced women with
that of married women.
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As mentioned earlier married women are put into two categories, those who
are married at time t but become separated at a later point in the panel and those
who remain married throughout the whole period that they have been observed. I
refer to the former as temporarily married and to the later as constantly married.
The transition rates among divorced women then, is compared with the rates
among both types of married women, temporarily or constantly married. The
temporarily married women are practically the same women who become divorced
at some later point in time. Therefore divorced women in these tables are mostly
the temporarily married ones observed at the divorcee state.
If labour income is one of the major income resources of divorced women,
then temporarily married women who are not in paid work and foresee a marital
dissolution should show higher rates of transitions into full time or part time
employment compared to constantly married women. Moreover, once in full time
employment do divorced women tend to remain in full time employment? Since
these women do not have access to a partner’s income, having a job can be the
most trust able source of financial security. Having these questions in mind we can
look at the average transition rates in labour market between any two consecutive
years.
Transition rates are depicted in table 1.4. The row percentages in this table are
the labour market status at current period conditional on last period’s economic
activity. The row and column totals respectively refer to unconditional economic
activities for the previous and current periods.
The first point to be noticed from transition rates depicted in table 1.4 is that
most of the people in this sample tend to remain in the labour market status of
their choice between any two consecutive years. The lowest attachment is observed
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Table 1.4: Average Transition Rates
Year t− 1 Year t Row Totals
Not Working Part-time Full-time
Permanently Married
Not working
% of Row 85 11 4
% of Total 24 3 1 28
Number of Observations 9,169 1,112 404 10,685
Part-time
% of Row 8 77 15
% of Total 3 25 5 33
Number of Observations 1,095 9,697 1,427 12,219
Full-time
% of Row 5 7 88
% of Total 2 3 34 39
Number of Observations 744 1,480 14,053 16,277
Column Totals 28 31 41 100
Total Observations 11,008 12,289 15,884 39,181
Temporarily Married
Not working
% of Row 79 15 6
% of Total 26 5 2 33
Number of Observations 819 145 55 1,019
Part-time
% of Row 11 72 17
% of Total 4 22 5 31
Number of Observations 100 681 127 908
Full-time
% of Row 5 9 86
% of Total 2 3 31 36
Column Totals 31 31 38 100
Number of Observations 6 121 1,000 1,177
Divorced
Not working
% of Row 82 12 6
% of Total 26 4 2 32
Number of Observations 1,074 152 73 1,299
Part-time
% of Row 11 67 22
% of Total 3 17 6 26
Number of Observations 119 690 162 971
Full-time
% of Row 5 5 90
% of Total 2 2 38 42
Column Totals 31 23 46 100
Number of Observations 85 112 1,608 1,805
Total Observations 1,278 954 1,843 4,075
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to be to part time work. Regardless of the marital status, the attachment to full
time work is highest compared to part time or unemployment.
As expected, divorced women appear to have the highest attachment to full
time work, however the differences are small. The most frequent transition across
all groups is transition from part time employment to full time employment. This
shift is most pronounced among divorced women and is lowest among permanently
married women.
The second most observed transition is from not working to part time work and
the rate is highest for temporarily married women. One possible explanation is that
married women who foresee a future divorce and are not active in labour market,
start working while they are married and obtain some work experience which
then gives them more chances to shift to full time employment by the time they
are divorce. The lowest attachment to part time work is observed among divorced
women while the highest attachment is observed among constantly married women,
suggesting married women have access to a shared household income and therefore
can afford lower level of labour supply. To summarise:
1. Temporarily married and divorced women are more mobile in labour market
than constantly married women.
2. The transitions among divorced women is more towards higher rates of labour
supply.
To highlight the second point mentioned above, we can define a total change
in labour supply as all transitions into more labour supply (that is any shift from
part-time to full-time, not working to part-time or not working to full-time) mi-
nus all transition into less labour supply (that is any movement from full time
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Table 1.5: Average Transition Rates At Time of Divorce
Year t− 1 Year t Row Totals
Not Working Part-time Full-time
Not working
% of Row 85 11 4
% of Total 24 3 1 28
Part-time
% of Row 8 77 15
% of Total 3 25 5 33
Full-time
% of Row 5 7 88
% of Total 2 3 34 39
Column Totals 28 31 41 100
Number of Observations 248 176 299 723
to part time or not working and part time to not working) By looking at this
difference we can have an estimate of whether on average the labour supply in-
creases or decreases. The total change is positive for all three groups. Therefore
the decrease in labour supply is more than compensated by the increase in labour
supply and the highest increase is among divorced women. The numbers are as
following: 19% increase in labour supply among divorced women, 13% increase
among temporarily married women and 10% increase among constantly married
women. These numbers suggest that divorce increases the portability of employ-
ment among women and the increase in labour supply from part time to full time
among divorced women is noticeable.
Table 1.5 focuses on employment transitions of women at the time of divorce.
Thus year t − 1 refers to one year before separation. 15% of women who were
working part time prior to separation switch to full time employment, and 15%
of those who were out of labour market a year before separation move either to
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Table 1.6: Average Transition Rates
Year t− 1 Year t
Not Working Part-time Full-time
Permanently Married
NW, NW 91% 7% 2%
PT, PT 7% 84% 9%
FT, FT 4% 7% 89%
Temporarily Married
NW, NW 84% 12% 4%
PT, PT 8% 79% 13%
FT, FT 4% 7% 89%
Divorced
NW, NW 90% 7% 3%
PT, PT 7% 79% 14%
FT, FT 4% 4% 92%
full time or part time work. Whereas 12% of women who were full time employed
decrease their labour supply following divorce and only 8% of women who were
working part time before divorce, leave labour market following separation. These
numbers verify the above observation that on average women tend to increase their
labour supply after divorce.
In table 1.6, I look into transitions across three consecutive years. Therefore
I condition the current labour market state on the two previous labour market
states. To clarify the notations used in table 1.6, NW, NW refers to staying out
of labour market for two consecutive years prior to the current state. PT, PT
abbreviates two consecutive years in par time employment at times t− 2 and t− 1
and FT, FT refers to two consecutive years in full time employment. The labour
market states at time t, refer to economic activity at the time of the observation,
i.e. time t. The numbers presented in table 1.6 confirm the previous findings
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Table 1.7: Employment Status By Education
Not working Part time Full time
Married
Uni Degree 23% 26% 51%
No Uni Degree 33% 31% 36%
Divorced
Uni Degree 14% 20% 66%
No Uni Degree 35% 24% 41%
Always Married Not working Part time Full time
Uni Degree 20% 25% 55%
No Uni Degree 31% 32% 37%
regarding transitions for women with different marital states.
It is well known that investment in education yields positive returns in labour
market. Therefore we should expect the employment rate to increase with level
of investment in educations. Table 1.7 compares the distribution of women in
different employment states while making a distinction between women with and
without universtiy qualification
It is well known that investment in education yields positive returns in labour
market. Therefore we should expect the employment rate to increase with level
of investment in educations. Table 1.7 compares the distribution of women in
different employment states while making a distinction between women with and
without university qualification. The first four rows in table 1.7 depicts the employ-
ment rate among women who are temporarily married and later become divorced.
These numbers can be thought as the change in employment pattern of the same
women who are observed at both married and divorced state.
As observed in this table 66% of divorced women who hold a teaching, first, or
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higher university degree are in full time employment. This number decreases to
51% when we look at married women with the same educational qualifications. The
gap between participation rate of married and divorced women gets smaller among
women with lower levels of education. Women without a university degree are on
average less active in labour market. The difference in full time employment of
married and divorced women who do not hold a university degree is only 5% which
is half of the number that is observed for women with higher level of education. In
conclusion being divorced and having a university degree increases the probability
of full time employment by 15% points, compared with being married and having
a university degree. To summarise the observed patterns in this table it can be
stated that having university education is associated with increase in labour supply
upon divorce.
The bottom section of table 1.7 summarises the employment pattern of women
who do not experience a divorce conditional on having a university degree. This
group should be considered as a control group for the married women who even-
tually got separated or divorced. Comparing the employment rates indicates that
there are not many differences among constantly married women and married
women who separate from their partner later on.
The final table of this section is a comparison of employment rate among women
with and without children. The purpose of this table is to see to what extent having
dependent children affects employment patterns and whether or not women with
different levels of eduaction respond differently to presence of dependent children
in their household.
Table 1.8 depicts this trend among married women with or without dependent
children. As the level of education increases the percentage of women who are
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Table 1.8: Employment Rates Conditioned on Education and Dependent Children
Women with Dependent Children
Not Working Part-time Full-time Total
Less than O-level 57% 25% 18% 100%
GCE O-leves 35% 33% 32% 100%
GCE A-levels 36% 37% 27% 100%
College 24% 37% 39% 100%
Nursing Qualification 29 % 32% 39% 100%
Teaching Qualification 21% 18% 61% 100%
University First Degree 20% 28% 52% 100%
University Higher Degree 1% 31% 68% 100%
Total 37% 31% 32% 100%
Women without Dependent Child
Not Working Part-time Full-time Total
Less than O-level 42% 16% 42% 100%
GCE O-leves 21% 9% 70% 100%
GCE A-levels 17% 12% 71% 100%
College 15% 12% 73% 100%
Nursing Qualification 15 % 11% 74% 100%
Teaching Qualification 15% 11% 74% 100%
University First Degree 8% 10% 82% 100%
University Higher Degree 13% 15% 72% 100%
Total 23% 12% 65% 100%
not working decreases and the percentage who are working full time increases.
This holds regardless of presence of children. However, the difference in full time
employment rate between highly and lowly educated women is more pronounced
in the presence of children. A married woman with university degree who has
dependent children is 50% more likely to be working full time, compared with
a woman has less than O-levels qualification. This difference narrows down for
women without a dependent child.
1.6 Estimation Results
So far the descriptive statistics suggested that divorce is associated with an increase
in women’s labour supply. In this section I test this claim while controlling for
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observable heterogeneities. The first step is looking at a simple OLS regression of
average hours normally worked per week given characteristics such as age, educa-
tion, age and number of children and non labour income and marital status which
is either being married or being divorced. Therefore the pool of divorced women
across all waves are compared with the pool of married women. The coefficient of
divorce should indicate whether being divorced is associated with supplying more
hours of labour.
The first set of estimations presented in table 1.9 are based on the sample
of working and not working women. Regardless of current economic status, the
results suggest that divorce increases number of hours normally worked per week
by 65 minutes. The second set of estimates, presented in last column of table 1.9,
show how hours of work is affected by divorce among employed women. In this
case, the effect of divorce on labour supply is around 140 minutes per week.
Any level of educational qualification as opposed to no qualification increases
the number of hours worked. Women with one dependent child work around 4
hours less per week compared with childless women. Having two or more children
decreases labour supply up to 12 hours per week. More access to non labour
income can decrease labour supply by as much as 12 hours per week. This effect
narrows to around 3 hours per week if we look at the sample of employed women.
The OLS estimates provide an understanding on how the labour supply is af-
fected by divorce on the intensive margin. What is more interesting than average
increase in hours worked per week, is to understand how divorce affects the prob-
abilities of part time and full time work conditional on some basic characteristics.
To answer this question, I use a Multinomial Logit model to be able to distinguish
the effect of divorce on extensive margins as well. Suppose Yit denotes an observed
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Table 1.9: OLS Regression Of Number of Hours Worked per Week
All sample Employed sample
Divorce 1.103** 2.379***
(2.87) (7.46)
Age 1.150 -0.767
(1.66) (-1.20)
Age squared -0.00820 0.0250
(-0.49) (1.60)
Age cubed -0.000111 -0.000270*
(-0.84) (-2.18)
Education
Commercial Qualifications 3.443*** 1.295*
(5.47) (2.04)
O-level 6.244*** 2.646***
(12.87) (5.39)
A-level 7.298*** 3.318***
(12.74) (5.88)
Other Higher Degree 9.363*** 3.802***
(21.14) (8.32)
University Degree 11.75*** 5.480***
(21.51) (10.69)
Dependent Children
One Child -4.182*** -4.514***
(-11.49) (-15.08)
Two Children -7.504*** -7.409***
(-17.77) (-20.51)
Three or more Children -10.93*** -9.528***
(-20.42) (-16.93)
Quartile 2 non-labour Income -3.835*** -1.344***
(-12.87) (-5.49)
Quartile 3 non-labour Income -7.787*** -2.033***
(-23.50) (-7.54)
Quartile 4 non-labour Income -12.24*** -2.791***
(-32.85) (-8.10)
Constant -0.579 38.34***
(-0.06) (4.57)
Time controls Yes Yes
Location controls Yes Yes
Number of Observations 54966 39201
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
t statistics in parentheses
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labour market status of individual i at time t. Yi takes three values, full-time work,
part-time work and not working. Let m be the alternative of interest, then the
predicted probability that individual i chooses alternative m, i.e. one of the labour
market states is given by:
Pr(Yit = m) =
exp(xitγm)∑M
k=1 exp(xitγk)
Where xit is a set of attributes of decision maker i. It is clear from the above
expression that the predictors (xit’s) do not vary across different choices of labour
market supply, but the parameters associated with them (γ’s) do vary across alter-
natives. k refers to the two alternatives that are not chosen by a given individual
at time t. To estimate the above multinomial logit model, apart from some time
variant (Xit) characteristics such as marital state, number of children, age, level
of education, and non labour income, the history of labour market choices are
included as a predictor in the model. Therefore for each individual:
Pr(Yit = m) = f(Xit, Yit−k)
where the dependent variable, Yit is labour market status. Yit−k denotes lagged
values of labour market status of each individual (k = 1, 2).
The results of estimating the above model are presented in table 1.10. From
this table we can observe how the probability of being in part-time or full-time
employment changes with divorce, having controlled for some characteristics of
each individual. The employment state that is set as base of comparison in 1.10
is unemployment or inactivity i.e., the probabilities of full time or part time em-
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Table 1.10: Multinomial Logit Estimates
Predictor Coefficient (S.D.) Risk Ratio
Full-time
Divorce 0.27* (0.11) 1.32
Age -0.54*** (0.11) 0.58
Age squared 0.01*** (0.00) 1.01
Other qualification 0.12 (0.09) 1.13
O-levels 0.49*** (0.07) 1.63
A-levels 0.37*** (0.09) 1.45
Some College 0.64*** (0.07) 1.89
University Degree 0.90*** (0.09) 2.47
Child aged 0-6 -1.65*** (0.06) 0.19
L.Full time 3.58*** (0.05) 35.80
L.Part time 1.55*** (0.05) 4.70
L2.Full time 0.92*** (0.05) 2.50
L2.Part time -0.02 (0.05) 0.98
L.Full time*Divorced -0.02 (0.15) 0.98
L.Part time*Divorced -0.21 (0.16) 0.81
L2.Full time*Divorced 0.33* (0.16) 1.39
L2.Part time*Divorced 0.66*** (0.17) 1.94
Part-time
Divorce -0.18* (0.096) 0.84
Age -0.05 (0.10) 0.95
Age squared 0.00 (0.00) 1.00
Other qualification 0.11 (0.08) 1.11
O-levels 0.30*** (0.06) 1.34
A-levels 0.16* (0.08) 1.17
Some College 0.36*** (0.06) 1.43
University Degree 0.45*** (0.09) 1.57
Child aged 0-6 -0.52*** (0.04) 0.60
L.full time 1.75*** (0.06) 5.73
L.part time 2.95*** (0.05) 19.17
L2.Full time 0.21*** (0.06) 1.24
L2.Part time 0.89*** (0.05) 2.43
L.Full time*Divorced -0.14 (0.19)* 0.87
L.Part time*Divorced -0.37** (0.13) 0.69
L2.Full time*Divorced 0.24 (0.19) 1.28
L2.Part time*Divorced 0.52*** (0.14) 1.68
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Number of Obsevations 54,596
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ployment are compared with the probability of not working. Standard errors are
clustered by individuals and most of the variables are self explanatory but there
are a few points to be clarified.
Apart from age and squared value of age, the rest of the variables are binary.
The interest is on the binary variable of divorce which takes value zero if a woman is
married and value one if she is divorced. In table 9, both coefficients and likelihood
ratios are presented. However the interpreting the coefficients of Multinomial Logit
which are expressed in log format is not very straightforward, therefore we can use
the relative risk ratios to interpret the results. L.full time, L.Part time, L2.Full
time, and L2.Part time refer to first and second lagged values of full time and part
time employment. For instance, L2.Full time indicates whether an individual has
been in full time employment in period t − 2. As it can be observed from table
1.10, being divorced increases the probability of full time work by 32%, compared
to not working, and decreases the probability of part time work by 15%. Said in
other words, the estimated model suggests that probability of being a part-time
worker decreases with divorce or separation and odds of working full time increase
by 32% for separated/divorced women.
Having young children who are aged less than 6 years old, decreases the proba-
bility of employment either part time or full time but the effect is more pronounced
on full time employment. Education increases the chances of employment and the
higher is the education level, the bigger is the effect on full time employment than
on part time employment. A woman with a university degree is 2.5 times more
likely to be working full time than not be working at all and 1.6 times more likely
to be working part time than not working. The last four covariates in table 1.10
are interactions of lagged values of full time and part time work with divorced.
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These variables can indicate how much being divorced and having labour market
experience affects the chances of full time or part time work. The fist lagged values
interacted with divorce are not significant but the second lagged values, i.e. the
employment status 2 periods prior to the current year interacted with divorced
provide meaningful information. Women who were in full time employment two
years before the current observation and are divorced are almost 1.5 times more
likely to be working full time at the current year.
1.7 Understanding the Role of Divorce
The prediction of the Multinomial Logit estimation that divorce increases the
probability of full time employment is in line with the earlier statistical analysis.
However the decrease in part time employment compared to not working may seem
puzzling at first. The argument so far was that divorced women tend to increase
labour supply to compensate for loss of income. Table 1.10 suggests that divorced
women are more likely to be out of work than to be working part time.
I repeated the regressions presented in table 1.10 once for women with a uni-
versity degree and once for women without a university degree. Therefore I isolate
those women with high investment in education which are more likely to have more
experience in labour market from the rest of observations and then compare the
role of divorce on full time and part time employment among these two groups.
The results are presented in table 1.11. Among the highly educated group di-
vorce has a bigger effect on odds of full time employment and it plays no significant
role on the odds of part time work. The no university qualification group, are 18%
more likely to be out of work than be in part time employment and they are 30%
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Table 1.11: Multinomial Logit by Education Groups
Predictor Full-time (Odds Ratios) Part-time (Odds Ratios)
With University Degree
Divorce 2.63* 1.43
(1.16) (0.66)
Child 0-6 0.22*** 0.70*
(0.26) (0.56)
L.Full time 18.27*** 4.85***
(2.70) (0.75)
L.Part time 3.89*** 19.37*
(0.58) (0.24)
L2.Full time 2.22*** 1.54**
(0.33) (0.24)
L2.Part time 0.83 2.23***
(0.12) (0.33)
Sample Size 8,924
Without University Degree
Divorce 1.29* 0.82*
(0.14) (0.08)
Child 0-6 0.31*** 0.81***
(0.26) (0.56)
L.Full time 39.32*** 6.09***
(2.3) (0.39)
L.Part time 4.93*** 19.55***
(0.28) (0.94)
L2.Full time 2.53*** 1.17**
(0.15) (0.07)
L2.Part time 1.11* 2.55***
(0.07) (0.13)
Sample Size 47,228
more likely to be working full time than not working at all. The role of divorce on
part time employment is significant in the case of lower educated women.
So far it has been learnt that divorce has different effects on labour market
activities of those women who have a university qualification and those women
who do not. I find it informative to look at the mean and median of average
working hours of women from four years before their divorce until four years after
divorce. I separate women based on their education levels and denote the year
that divorce has occurred by 0, so the year of divorce is the base year, the years
before are denoted by negative numbers and the years after are denoted by positive
numbers. Average working hours per week are shown on the vertical axis. Relative
time to divorce is shown on horizontal axis. I should stress that these relative years
are independent of calendar years. For example for one woman time zero happens
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Figure 1.7: Women Labour Supply before and After Divorce by Education
in 1998 and for another woman it can be in 2005. Therefore the median or mean
of average weekly hours worked should be independent of calendar years.
Figer 1.7 summarises the median labour supply before and after divorce for
women with different education levels. The medians are not conditioned on labour
market status. It is observed that in consecutive years after divorce labour supply
of women, specially those with a university degree increases. If the number of
divorces increase during recessions, then the observed increase in labour supply
after divorce can be attributed to the recovery of the economy rather than effect
of divorce.
Figure 1.8 depicts a picture of unemployment rate in UK for the past few
decades. The graphs in Figure 1.8 are taken from a labour market report by Office
of National Statistics. As seen in the graph the two recessions during 1991 and
44
Figure 1.8: National Unemployment Rates-ONS Report
2008, coincide with the beginning and end of the survey used in this study. Unem-
ployment has been falling since 1993 until 2008 without any big shifts throughout
this period.
Figure 1.9 on the other hand, presents a picture of the divorce rates over the
past decades. This graph is derived from the Population Trends report of National
Statistics. According to this graph divorce rates have been declining from 1991
until around 2005. Since I limit the sample to those observations for which I
can observe employment before and after divorce, the trends shown in Figure 1.7
correspond to divorces that took place no later than 2007 or 2006 (depending on
timing of data collection). Eye-balling the national statistics of unemployment and
divorce rates from 1991 to 2008, does not suggest that the divorce rates coincide
with a recession period and thus the increase in labour supply after divorce cannot
be attributed to recovery of the economy.
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Figure 1.9: National Divorce Rates-National Statistics Report
Figure 1.10: Average Divorce Rates in the BHPS Sample
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Figure 1.11: Men Labour Supply before and After Divorce by Education
In Figure 1.10 I present the average number of divorces at each wave of the
panel and we can observe that there is no mass point at the beginning or at the
end of the panel. Of course the discussion of cyclical divorce rates requires a much
deeper investigation which can be a scope of future research for this paper.
Although the focus of this study is on the behaviour of married women, for
the sake of comparison I have replicated the graph that depicts median hours of
work before and after divorce using a sample of married men (graph 1.11). As
seen in this graph, the labour supply of men does not vary much with a change in
marital status. Specially For college graduates and above the labour supply stays
relatively flat before and after divorce. This graph provides a further evidence
that increase in labour supply of women after divorce is not the result of average
increases in employment in the economy.
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1.8 Conclusion
According to the findings of this study, divorce plays a significant role on behaviour
of women in labour market. Women are observed to increase their labour supply
following a divorce. Divorce increases labour supply at intensive and extensive
margins. The labour supply of women after marital dissolution is heterogeneous
in their level of investment in education. Among women without a university
degree the rates of full time employment are relatively unchanged following divorce,
however the odds of unemployment compared to part time work increase. In
another word, women who do not hold a university degree seem to shift from part
time work into actively looking for a job in labour market. Among university
graduates, divorce increases the odds of full time employment whether the base of
comparison is part time work or not working.
Given that the recent reforms in the U.K. are aimed at decreasing poverty by
promoting in work benefits it is important to investigate how successful divorced
women are in entering labour market. It would be interesting for a policy maker
to take into account the challenges faced by divorced women who do not have
accumulation of human capital either through work experience or through higher
educational attainments in finding paid work. Understanding that women with low
levels of education tend to be less active in labour market can help with alleviating
some of barriers of finding jobs for women for instance by providing training to
these women.
48
Chapter 2
An Empirical Test of On the Match Search
in the Marriage Market
2.1 Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Becker (1974), economic literature has been studying
how decisions to form partnerships or to dissolve them are formed within house-
holds. Household’s decision-making processes have been analysed through various
theoretical frameworks. The focus of this chapter is on the search and matching
framework, specifically on the strand that assumes positive assortative matching
in the marriage market.
According to search theory, heterogeneous agents engage in search to find a po-
tential partner. Positive assortative sorting (hereafter called PAM) implies agents
mate with their likes. With perfect information and no search frictions the market
will be in equilibrium when men and women of similar traits are matched with each
other and the matches are stable, i.e. no one is willing to deviate from the equilib-
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rium outcome. With perfect information, search friction makes it costly to search
long enough to find one’s own type and therefore agents might accept a marriage
offer even though that marriage is not their optimal match. Allowing divorce and
re-partnership imply that agents can keep on searching for their perfect partner
while matched with a less ideal mate. Equilibrium is reached when all agents are
re-matched with their best potential partner. In this setting mismatched agents
have the motivation to divorce to upgrade to a better partner.
If agents do not have ex-ante perfect information about traits of their potential
partner, they engage in a partnership and form expectations about future payoffs.
While matched they start learning about their partner’s traits (and perhaps about
their own traits too) and re-evaluate their marriage. If the new information is not
favourable and the value of the match is below their expectations they separate.
The decision to separate depends on value of outside options. In this case the
outside option is remaining single or re-marriage.
Another way of looking at the problem is through imperfect information at the
time of marriage. Imperfect information implies that some traits of spouses-to-be
are not visible at the time of marriage. Positive assortative mating argues that
agents prefer to be matched with their own type. PAM combined with imperfect
information suggest that after the match is formed and partners learn about each
other’s characteristics they decide to separate if the realised characteristics of their
partner are not matched with their own. In this case too, the mismatch is the cause
of divorce and if the model allows re-partnership a potential better match provides
motivation to divorce.
To complete the discussion about application of search framework to marriage
market, I review a few papers that have contributed to this strand of literature.
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Mortensen (1988) points out when the value of the match is initially unknown, a
partnership may dissolve either because one of the partners receives an alternative
offer with higher capital gain or because the realised value of the match once
the partnership is formed is below expectation.Cornelius (2003) applies the on-
the-job search theory of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) to the marriage market
to explain divorce patterns. She divides people into good companions and bad
companions (as seen in Burdett and Coles (1998)) and considers the good-good
and bad-bad companionships stable matches whereas in any other match each
party has a motivation to search for a better companion while already matched.
Masters (2008) studies the marriage and divorce patterns with a matching model
in which people age, and through ageing may lose their attractiveness. He finds
marriages between equally attractive people stable but, mixed marriages are not
stable in his framework. Goldmanis et al. (2013) state that matches are not be
stable if the parties can search for a better partner while matched. They suggest
divorce and remarriage continue until every one is matched to their own type.
The reasons for divorce provided by search literature can be summarised in three
groups:
1. Learning; In this strand of models divorce is the outcome of a matching
process with ex-ante uncertaintly about quality of the match. The true
value of the match is to be discovered ex-post. A poor draw from the set of
match quality can result in divorce. Works of Brien et al. (2006), Chiappori
et al. (2008), Bruze et al. (2015) fall in this group.
2. On the match search; In these models agents are impatient and search is
costly. Thus even with perfect information agents accept a non-optimal offer
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but continue to search while matched. Matches end in separation when
one or both partners receive a better offer. Resorting can continue until all
agents are matched to their optimal partner. Divorce can be an endogenous
outcome and depends on the level of trust between spouses. Agents who
believe their partner is searching while matched, start a search of their own
thus partnerships formed in this environment will be less stable. (Mortensen
(1988), Burdett and Coles (1998), Burdett et al. (2004), Cornelius (2003),
Masters (2008), Goldmanis et al. (2013)
3. Idiosyncratic Match Value Shocks; Another way of modelling divorce is to
assume that the only risks of dissolution for matches that seemed favourable
at the time of formation are exogenous shocks to the idiosyncratic match
values. These values can be considered as the love factor in a marriage (as
seen in Fernandez et al. (2001)). Modelling divorce as an exogenous shock
to the initial love draw is seen in Weiss and Willis (1997) and , Jacquemet
and Robin (2013)).
Despite the rich theoretical framework under which one can study the potential
causes of divorce, the empirical studies conducted to test these theories seems to
be very limited. The most comprehensive empirical study in this literature is the
Weiss and Willis (1997). Similarly to Mortensen (1988), Weiss and Willis (1997)
argue that people meet randomly and thus there is the possibility that a matched
person can find a better partner than his current match. They further argue that
unanticipated changes in the characteristics of the partners can trigger divorce.
Therefore probability of divorce should be lower amongst couples who are well
matched. Weiss and Willis (1997) conduct an empirical study of whether the
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unexpected changes to earning capacity can trigger divorce. The findings of their
empirical study are discussed in the proceeding sections.
This chapter contributes to the literature by an empirical study of whether
mismatch can increase the likelihood of divorce. In what follows I first describe a
model of marriage and divorce with supermodular payoffs and positive sorting and
then empirically test the predictions of the model. The purpose of this chapter is
investigating to what extent re-sorting in marriage market can explain the decision
to end a marital partnership.
2.2 A Model of Marriage and Divorce.
I consider equilibrium matching, divorce and re-matching in the context of a two-
period model with ex-ante heterogeneous agents. Utility is transferable and all
matches are heterosexual. Each individual is characterised by sex s = f,m and
a type x ∈ R. The population distribution of x is the same for both sexes and
the measure of males and females is also the same. Throughout the focus is on
symmetric equilibria where men and women of the same type x adopt the same
marriage and divorce strategies. I assume the payoff through remaining single is
sufficiently negative that all form partnerships. If a male x matches with a female
x′ then family output is F (x, x′) where F (.) is increasing, symmetric and strictly
supermodular so that:
F (xL, xL) + F (xH , xH) > 2F (xL, xH) for all xL 6= xH .
53
Matching is frictionless. In a one-period context a stable match allocation would
correspond to a matching set M(x) and terms of trade Vf (.), Vm(.) such that:
Vm(x) + Vf (x
′) = F (x, x′) if x′ ∈M(x),
Vm(x) + Vf (x
′) ≥ F (x, x′) if x′ /∈M(x).
A stable match allocation implies a matched pair enjoy corresponding equilib-
rium payoffs Vf (.),Vm(.) Stability requires should the male (or female) match with
any other female (male) x′ /∈ M(x) then, after compensating her with her equi-
librium payoff Vf (x
′), his residual payoff F (x, x′) − Vf (x′) ≤ Vm(x) and so is not
better off. Hence, no one can identify an alternative match which strictly increases
surplus. As it is well known, a symmetric environment and supermodular payoffs
imply the unique stable matching outcome in that each male x marries a female
with the same type; i.e. M(x) = x. Furthermore symmetry implies each partner
enjoys the same equilibrium payoff Vm(x) = Vf (x) =
1
2
F (x, x).
Here instead there are two periods. Suppose in the first period, a match (x, x′)
forms. In the second period there are individual specific type shocks, so that the
male’s second period type xm = x+ ε,the female’s second period type xf = x
′+ ε′.
I assume each (ε, ε′) is an independent random draw from cumulative distribution
function G(ε, ε′) which is symmetric. Given those realisations, the couple (xm, xf )
then choose either to remain married or each pays a divorce cost c to separate. If
they separate, both re-enter the divorcee market and rematch with a new partner.
Similar to Chiappori et al. (2008) and Jacquemet and Robin (2013) the types
are defined by wages or productivities. Unlike their work, however, here it is
assumed that shocks are given to individual types rather than to the match quali-
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ties. Let V dm(xm)−c, V df (xf )−c denote their respective equilibrium payoffs through
separation and equilibrium rematching in the divorcee market. As utility is trans-
ferable, the partners choose to divorce if and only if joint production is too small;
i.e. when:
F (xm, xf ) < V
d
m(xm) + V
d
f (xf )− 2c, (2.1)
For completeness, though it plays no important part in what follows, I assume
partners who do not divorce share the match surplus by symmetric Nash bargaining
with threat points equal to each agent’s payoff through divorce. Thus individual
second period match payoffs are:
V 2m(xm, xf ) = max
[
V dm(xm) +
1
2
[F (xm, xf )− V dm(xm)− V df (xf )], V dm(xm)− c
]
V 2f (xm, xf ) = max
[
V df (xf ) +
1
2
[F (xm, xf )− V dm(xm)− V df (xf )], V df (xf )− c
]
where the first payoff applies if divorce is not jointly efficient (and match surplus
is divided equally), otherwise they separate and obtain their respective divorce
payoffs. More importantly, second-period joint surplus is:
V 2m(xm, xf ) + V
2
f (xm, xf ) = max
[
F (xm, xf ), V
d
m(xm) + V
d
f (xf )− 2c
]
.
I now formally define a stable match allocation in the first period.
Agents maximise expected discounted lifetime utility with discount factor β ≤
1. Let V s(x) denote the expected equilibrium discounted payoff of an agent of type
x with sex s = m, f. A stable match allocation is a first period matching set M(x)
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and values V s(x) with the property: Vf (x
′)
V m(x)+V f (x
′) = F (x, x′)+βEmax
[
F (xm, xf ), V
d
m(xm) + V
d
f (xf )− 2c
]
if x′ ∈M(x)
(2.2)
V m(x)+V f (x
′) ≥ F (x, x′)+βEmax [F (xm, xf ), V dm(xm) + V df (xf )− 2c] otherwise,
(2.3)
where divorce values V ds (.) are consistent with a stable match allocation in the
divorcee market.
For tractability, I restrict attention to the characterization and existence of
symmetric stable match allocations. In such equilibria M(x) = x; i.e. males of
type xmarry females of the same type. Symmetry not only implies men and women
enjoy the same payoffs V m(x) = V f (x) ≡ V (x), they also adopt the same divorce
strategies. As the distribution of singles in the divorcee market must then be the
same by sex, it immediately follows that a symmetric stable match allocation in
the divorcee market yields payoffs:
V dm(x) = V
d
f (x) =
1
2
F (x, x)
as each divorcee x rematches with the same type. (2.1) now implies a couple with
ex-post types (xm, xf ) will divorce in the second period if and only if:
1
2
F (xm, xm) +
1
2
F (xf , xf )− F (xm, xf ) > 2c. (2.4)
As payoffs are supermodular, this implies divorce occurs whenever ex-post types
(xm, xf ) are sufficiently ”different”. Note further that (2.2) implies equilibrium
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payoffs:
V (x) =
1
2
F (x, x)+
1
2
βEmax
[
F (x+ ε, x+ ε′),
1
2
F (x+ ε, x+ ε) +
1
2
F (x+ ε′, x+ ε′)− 2c
]
(2.5)
where depending on type shocks (ε,ε′), the second-period divorce outcome max-
imises the joint surplus of the match. The above has thus established the following
Proposition.
Proposition 1. If a symmetric stable match allocation exists, equilibrium payoffs
V (x) are given by (2.5) and divorce occurs in any equilibrium match (x, x) when
shocks (ε, ε′) imply:
1
2
F (x+ ε, x+ ε) +
1
2
F (x′ + ε′, x′ + ε′)− F (x+ ε, x′ + ε′) > 2c. (2.6)
Below we consider in detail how the divorce outcome depends on the realised
shocks (ε, ε′). First, however, we consider the existence of a symmetric stable match
allocation. By (2.3) and Proposition 1, a symmetric stable match allocation exists
if and only if:
V (x)+V (x′) ≥ F (x, x′)+βEmax
[
F (x+ ε, x′ + ε′),
1
2
F (x+ ε, x+ ε) +
1
2
F (x+ ε′, x′ + ε′)− 2c
]
.
(2.7)
for all x, x′ with V (x) given by (2.5). Substituting out V (x), (2.7) holds if and
only if:
1
2
F (x, x) +
1
2
F (x′, x′)− F (x, x′) + βΨ(x, x′, c) ≥ 0 for all x, x′, (2.8)
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where:
Ψ(x, x′; c) = Emax
[
1
2
F (x+ ε, x+ ε′)
1
4
F (x+ ε, x+ ε) +
1
4
F (x+ ε′, x+ ε′)− c
]
+Emax
[
1
2
F (x′ + ε, x′ + ε′),
1
4
F (x′ + ε, x′ + ε) +
1
4
F (x′ + ε′, x′ + ε′)− c
]
−Emax
[
F (x+ ε, x′ + ε′),
1
2
F (x+ ε, x+ ε) +
1
2
F (x′ + ε′, x′ + ε′)− 2c
]
.(2.9)
As supermodularity implies 1
2
F (x, x) + 1
2
F (x′, x′)F (x, x′) ≥ 0, existence of a sym-
metric stablematch allocation is established if it can be shown that Ψ(x, x′; c) ≥ 0.
Consider now the divorce set:
D(x, x′; c) = {(ε, ε′) : 1
2
F (x+ε, x+ε)+
1
2
F (x′+ε′, x′+ε′)−F (x+ε, x′+ε′) > 2c}
(2.10)
which is the set of shocks (ε, ε′) for which partners (x, x′) will choose to divorce.
The probability of divorce is then given by
P (x, x′; c) =
∫
(ε,ε′)∈D(x,x′;c)
dG(ε, ε′).
Proposition 2 establishes a useful relationship between the existence of symmetric
stable match allocations and divorce probabilities.
Proposition 2. A sufficient condition for the existence of a symmetric stable
match allocation is that divorce probabilities P(.) are submodular; i.e.
P (x, x; .) + P (x′, x′; .)− 2P (x, x′; .) ≤ 0. (2.11)
Proof. Direct inspection finds Ψ(x, x′; c) = 0 when c = 0 : when there is
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no cost to divorce, all reallocate in the second period and the first period match
allocation has no impact on second period surplus. Differentiating (2.9) with
respect to c implies:
∂Ψ
∂c
= −P (x, x; .)− P (x′, x′; .) + 2P (x, x′; .). (2.12)
As (2.11) implies Ψ(x, x′; c) is increasing in c, then Ψ(x, x′; c) = 0 at c = 0 implies
Ψ(x, x′; c) ≥ 0 for all c ≥ 0. As this establishes (2.8), this completes the proof of
Proposition 2.
Submodular divorce probabilities would seem particularly intuitive: they sim-
ply say that un-like partners divorce with greater probability than do-like partners.
Although this is a simple and intuitive criterion, however, it is not simple to es-
tablish general conditions under which it might hold.
For example suppose the standard production function F (x, x′) = xx′. In a
single period context with no divorce, it is well known this production function
implies positive assortative matching. But this is not sufficient with type shocks
and second-period divorce options. For example, this production function and
(2.10) implies the divorce set:
D(x, x′; c) = {(ε, ε′) : [(x+ ε)− (x′ + ε′)]2 > 4c};
i.e. divorce occurs whenever:
ε′ < ε+ x− x′ − 2c0.5 (2.13)
ε′ > ε+ x− x′ + 2c0.5.
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Figure 2.1: Divorce Set
Figure 2.1 describes the divorce set when like partners match; i.e. x′ = x.
Partners remain married when the (ε, ε′) shocks lie in the band described in Figure
2.1. Thus when type shocks are positively correlated; i.e. both do better or both do
worse, there is little value to resorting in the divorcee market and the partnership
survives. Divorce instead occurs whenever |ε′ − ε| is sufficiently large; i.e. one
does well, the other does relatively badly. The case when x = x′ is interesting for
the ”remain married” band is centered around (0,0). If most of the probability
mass G(ε, ε′) is centered around (0,0), matching with one’s own type would seem
to maximise the probability of remaining married. Instead an increase in x′ to,
say, x′ = x + ∆ with ∆ > 0, shifts down the ”remain married” band by ∆ and
it is no longer centered around (0,0). It would thus seem reasonable to presume
that divorce probabilities are indeed submodular: an increase in ∆ increases the
probability of divorce. This is not, however, necessarily true.
For example, consider (ε, ε′) shocks which are perfectly negatively correlated,
e.g. with probability one half ε = ε, ε′ = −ε and with probability one half ε =
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−ε, ε′ = ε with ε > c0.5. In this case, divorce occurs with probability one when
x = x′ but divorce only occurs with probability one half at x − x′ = 2ε. In this
example the divorce probabilities are supermodular (like types are guaranteed to
divorce) and asymmetric matching is instead potentially optimal. For instance,
a male x may match with a female x′ < x on the gamble that she will have the
favourable shock and they will remain married in the second period. That is not to
say this is a particularly natural case, rather it demonstrates that assuming F (.)
is supermodular is no longer sufficient to guarantee positive assortative matching
with type shocks and costly divorce.
Perhaps the most natural case to consider and is the one identified in the
empirical section below, is that the type shocks ε′ε are independent draws from
G(.). The divorce probabilities are then given by:
P (x, x′; c) =
∫
ε
[G(ε+ x− x′ − 2c0.5) + 1−G(ε+ x− x′ + 2c0.5)]g(ε)dε
where, conditional on the male ε shock, which occurs with probability measure
g(ε), G(ε+x−x′−2c0.5) is the probability the ε′ shock is sufficiently low the couple
separate, while 1 − G is the probability the ε′ shock is sufficiently high. Clearly
the divorce probability only depends on the type gap [x − x′] = ∆.Establishing
submodularity on P (.) now reduces to showing:
∫
ε
 G(ε+ ∆− 2c0.5)−G(ε+ ∆ + 2c0.5)
−G(ε− 2c0.5) +G(ε+ 2c0.5)
 g(ε)dε > 0 (2.14)
for any ∆ > 0. Unfortunately there is no natural restriction on G(.) which guar-
antees (2.14). This condition does, however, describe the restriction on G which
61
ensures the existence of a symmetric stable match allocation.
Proposition 3. A symmetric stable match allocation exists for the case F (.) =
xx′ and any shock structure G which satisfies (2.14)
2.3 An Empirical Implementation of the Model.
I use the above insights to identify a consistent model of marriage and divorce.
For the case that F (x, y) = xy, partners (x, x′) who marry will divorce if they have
second period type shocks (ε, ε′) which satisfy (2.13). A stable, symmetric match
allocation further implies x′ = x in any first-period marriage and thus divorce
occurs in the second stage if and only if type shocks:
ε′ − ε < −2c0.5 (2.15)
ε′ − ε > 2c0.5. (2.16)
In other words, a partnership dissolves when one partner receives a much more
favourable shock than the other. In what follows I use Mincer wage equations
to identify wage shocks. The estimation method is explained more extensively in
the Econometric Method section. The prediction of the the theoretical framework
discussed above, is that divorce is more likely if one partner receives a favourable
wage shock while the other receives a more unfavourable shock. For when instead
both partners receive favourable shocks, or both receive unfavourable shocks, the
gain to resorting in the divorcee market is small and, as divorce is costly, partners
remain matched. This prediction is tested with household data in the following
sections.
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2.4 Data and Method
2.4.1 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this study is derived from 18 years of British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS), an annually repeated survey conducted in UK between 1991 and
2008. The sample of this study is an unbalanced panel of 26616 observations,
consisting of 4202 married couples aged between 23 to 55. This age criterion elim-
inates most of the full-time students and the retired from the labour market. Both
partners of selected couples are employed and/or have reported earned labour in-
come. I excluded the entire history of those partnerships in which at least one
spouse suffers from long-term sickness or disability. The event of interest is mar-
ital dissolution and is defined as either separation, divorce, or changing partner.
Given the considerable rate of misreporting of hours and earnings among the self
employed, and for the sake of having a homogeneous sample a common practice is
to exclude the self-employed from the data set. This means excluding the whole
history of those families for which, either or both partners have been at least once
in self employment. I chose to keep the self employed in my sample as I believe
they contribute valuable information to the regression model.
A summary of the economic activity of married men and women is presented
in Table 2.1. As observed in this table, although the employment rate per se is
not very different among men, women and couples with or without children, the
difference in the average working hours per week among employed men and women
is noticeable.
Table 2.2 compares a number of other characteristics of married couples who
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Table 2.1: Summary of economic activities
Women Men
With Childern Child-less With Children Child-less
Missing 0.08% 0.09% 0.29% 0.23%
Self-employed 5.94% 6.26% 18.13% 17.63%
Working < 16 hrs/week 23% 17% 2% 3%
Working 16 to 30 hrs/week 32% 28% 5% 9%
Working 30+ hrs/week 45% 55% 94% 88%
Employed 65.35% 76.76% 77.04% 72.60%
Working< 16 hrs/week 25% 11% 2% 3%
Working 16 to 30 hrs/week 41% 27% 3% 4%
Working 30+ hrs/week 34% 62% 95% 94%
Unemployed 1.21% 1.81% 3.01% 2.31%
Retired 0.06% 3.44% 0.39% 6.44%
Maternity leave 3.99% 0.98% 0.00% 0.00%
Family care 22.26% 9.72% 0.46% 0.07%
Full time student 0.79% 0.46% 0.35% 0.47%
Government training Scheme 0.03% 0.03% 0.11% 0.03%
Other 0.30% 0.45% 0.21% 0.22%
Number of observations 21642 17271 19,186 14829
experience divorce or separation with characteristics of married couples who remain
married as long as they have been surveyed. For making the comparison easier I
denote the former as currently-married (the terminology comes from Francesconi
(2002)) and the latter as always-married. Thus the currently married couples are
couples who are observed to be married to each other up to some point in the
panel but their marriage is observed to end in separation. Always married couples
are couples that have stayed together throughtout the survey years and thus are
never observed to separate from each other.
It is highlighted in past empirical work (Becker et al. (1977a), Mott and Moore
(1979) and Moore and Waite (1981)) that number of children, home ownership,
high levels of investment in education, race, living in metropolitan areas and
women’s employment, are among determinant factors of marital dissolution. These
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factors are measured by variables that are summarised in Table 2.2, where always-
married couples are compared with currently-married ones.
Investment in education is measured by highest qualification achieved. The
data suggests that the always-married group is slightly more educated than currently-
married group. Given the negligible change in educational attainments throughout
the panel it is reasonable to assume that educational qualification is fixed over time
for the sample of this study.
Race is another fixed trait that is known to explain probability of divorce to
some extent. Early works of Thornton (1985) and Moore and Waite (1981) find
blacks to be more likely to divorce. This trend is also observable at a later work
Stevenson and Wolfers (2007). Table 2.2 suggests that black females and males in
this sample are slightly more likely to have an unstable marriage compared with
non-blacks. However as evident in this table, non-whites are under represented
in this sample (only about 3% of respondents for all 18 waves of the panel are
non-whites). According to national statistics in years 1991 to 2001 about 7% - 9%
of the total UK population were non-whites, this number increased to about 14%
by 2011 (Source: 2013 briefing of ESRC Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity)-.
Another factor that is found to be a determinant of marital dissolution is living
in large metropolitan areas. Given the limited information provided by BHPS
regarding metropolitan areas in the UK, I only distinguish between inhabitants
of London with the rest of the UK. The statistic in Table 2.2 is consistent with
previous studies that suggest living in large cities is associated with higher rate of
marital instability.
A number of studies discuss that marriages tend to be less stable when wives are
engaged in the labour market. Average working hours of women who experience
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divorce are not considerably higher than those of married women who do not
undergo a marital dissolution. The always-married men seem to be working longer
hours per week, this evidence is consistent with the empirical evidence presented
in the following sections.
Not surprisingly, women and men in stable marriages are on average older than
the other group, which is an indication of longer duration of their marriage. Re-
garding the presence of dependent children in the household, at the first glance
it seems that couples with stable marriages tend to have fewer number of chil-
dren. This might seem surprising as children are usually considered as a marital
investment commodity, couples in an unstable marriage should be less likely to
make the investment. The number seems less controversial when the definition of
dependent children is taken into account. BHPS only keeps a record of the number
of dependent children who live in household and by definition these children are
under 16 years old (or in full-time education). Given that always-married couples
tend to be older than currently-married ones, it is likely that the children of the
former group have left the household by the time of the interview. However the
effect of children on marital dissolution requires deeper investigation.
Lastly, house ownership as another indicator of marriage specific investment
is compared among two groups. The statistical evidence suggests that couples in
more stable marriages tend to have higher rate of house ownership. It should be
added that the difference between owned outright rates among two groups, can
be partly attributed to the duration of the marriages. Given that the always-
married group have been married for a longer period, it can be the case that some
of these couples have paid off their mortgage by the time of the interview. Next
chapter discusses to what extent the variables described in table 2.2 determine the
66
probability of divorce.
2.4.2 Econometric Method
As mentioned in section 3, I use Mincer wage equations to identify wage shocks.
Income shocks are defined as an unexplained component of income after controlling
for observable worker’s ability. This choice of terminology for the residuals of
mincer wage equation is to reflect the interpretation that is given to these residuals
in this paper. This definition of income shock shall not be confused with the income
shocks described in the vast literature of permanent income hypothesis.
According to permanent income hypothesis the observed income at each time
period consists of observable time variant and time invariant characteristics as well
as transitory and permanent shocks. In this literature the permanent component
of income follows a martingale process and the transitory shocks are distributed
i.i.d. (Hall and Mishkin (1982)). With this definition of income process one can
then estimate the variance of transitory and permanent stochastic components.
Apart from complication in estimating these shocks, this specification has another
disadvantage that does not allow distinguishing between positive and negative
convergences from income and thus it is not clear how one can identify a measure
of sorting among couples using these income shocks. Additionally the shocks under
this specification are computed using an expectation about future income. Each
person’s income shock is based on the deviation of their actual income from their
own expectation of income and not from an average across identical individuals.
For these reasons I choose the residual’s of mincer wage equation as an indicator
of income shocks. permanent shocks.
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Mincer’s pioneering transformation of human capital theory, as seen below,
became the benchmark for estimating wages.
log yit = α + β1Xit + β2X
2
it +
k∑
i=1
γDit + it (2.17)
I estimate equation (2.17) based on two sub-samples of married males and females.
In the original Mincer’s model, investment in education is measured by number of
years spent in full-time education. Given that such specification imposes constant
return of education on earnings, it has been suggested in the return to education
literature; investment in education is better to be measured with multiple binary
variables for each level of achieved qualification. The use of multiple variables
relaxes the assumption that different levels of education have the same impact on
earnings (Blundell et al., 2001).
It should be noted that in most recent panel surveys, including BHPS, indi-
viduals are asked of their highest educational qualification rather than completed
years of schooling (Card, 1999). Therefore, the use of categorical variables instead
of number of years spent in full-time education at times is dictated by the method
of data collection. To be consistent with the advancements in the literature, I use
categorical variables to quantify investment in education.
Earnings(yi), are measured as annual labour income and include labour income
from employment and self-employment -BHPS does not provide enough informa-
tion for usage of hourly wages-. Variable X denotes potential years of work ex-
perience. Given unavailability of data regarding actual work experience, I use the
potential labour market experience as a proxy for work experience (as suggested
by Mincer, 1975). Lastly, dummy variables are included to control for year effects.
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Having estimated equation (2.17), the income shocks are defined:
εit = log yit − l̂og yit (2.18)
Which are the residuals of estimation and indicate the unexplained component of
income. Given that predicted earnings are defined by l̂og yi = α + β1X + β2X
2 +
k∑
i=1
γDi, the residuals can be interpreted as whether individual i’s earning is below
or above the average of a worker with similar education and potential experience.
According to the two-period model discussed in section (2), in second period,
agents learn about their own and their partner’s shock. After realisation of the
shocks, partners reassess the value of their marriage. Those with large shock differ-
ences can gain by resorting. Therefore, keeping a set of control variables constant,
spouses with big difference in shocks must be the most likely to divorce. Inequal-
ities in (2.15) suggest that divorce is more likely when the absolute difference
between shocks is larger than 2c0.5. To test this prediction with data, rather than
estimating cost of divorce, c and defining the exact threshold as seen in (2.15), I
focus on the difference between shocks to see whether increasing the difference can
predict rate of divorce.
Having defined a measure of mismatch among couples the next step it to test
whether these measures can partly explain the probability of divorce. Following the
theoretical framework the most natural way of conducting this empirical test would
be the following: At first show that at the time of marriage partners positively
sort on their productivity type. This comes from the assumption made at the first
period of the model where every one is matched to their own type. After evaluating
the degree of positive assortative mating at the time of marriage then the degree of
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divergence in types should be measured at the time of divorce. Finally, conditional
on having positive assortative mating at the time of marriage, the probability of
divorce can be estimated as a function of difference in shocks at the time of divorce.
Conducting the analysis in such a way requires rich information about pro-
ductivities of both partners when they were forming their marriage which means
limiting the sample to the marriages that their starting point is observed by the
researcher. Unfortunately focusing on marriages for which the full spell is ob-
served downgrades the sample size dramatically which makes any analysis based
on such small sample size unattractive. The sample size in study is of great im-
portance as there are four types of partnerships, and the separation rate must be
compared among these four groups. Furthermore, the lack of information about
starting point of the marriage prevents the use of a hazard function in estimating
the probability of marital dissolution.
A less attractive but more practical way of estimating the effect of productivity
mismatch on probability of divorce is to use this variable as an explanatory variable
in a binary response model where the response variable is the event of divorce.
The drawback of this method is that only the type differences at the time of
divorce contribute to the probability of divorce and the initial sorting is not taken
into account. Another drawback of this approach is that it is not possible to
distinguish the persistent type shocks from occasional ones. One way of dealing
with the latter issue is by grouping the ongoing marriages into stable and unstable
marriages where the unstable marriages are those that at some point during the
panel end in separation. Then estimating the probability of being in an unstable
or stable marriage as a function of average type shocks. This approach is presented
in the sensitivity analysis. In what follows I present the results from estimating
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the probability of divorce using binary response functional forms. The likelihood
function to be estimated is the following:
Logθit =
n∑
i=1
[
yitln
(
pr(yi = 1|Xit)
)
+ (1− yit)ln
(
pr(yi = 0|Xi)
)]
(2.19)
Where yit is the conditional probability of divorce for couple i at time t and
Xit are the set of covariates. The likelihood function is first estimated with a
pooled probit/logit estimation and then with a random effect probit specification
to model the serially correlated error terms. For additional checks the likelihood
is also estimated using C-log-log specification which does not impose a symmetric
shape on the likelihood function and is more adaptable to unequal number of zeros
and ones in the dependent variable.
2.5 Empirical Evidence
2.5.1 Main results
In the first specification, I let [εx − εy]2 to capture the degree of income shock
mismatch between couples. According to the model we should expect a positive
and significant coefficient of [εx − εy]2 on probability of divorce.
Estimated parameters are presented in Table 2.3. As seen in Table 2.3, results
do not support the prediction of the model; [εx − εy]2 has an insignificant (and
negative) coefficinet [εx − εy]2. Specification 1 imposes two restrictions. Firstly it
assumes all levels of difference have the same effect on the probability of divorce.
71
Secondly it treats the male and female shocks in a symmetric manner. There is no
distinguishing which partner receives a positive shock and which partner receives
a negative shock. As long as the magnitude of the shocks are the same, a couple
in which εx > 0; εy < 0 is not different from a couple with εx < 0; εy > 0.
Similarly a couple with εx < 0; εy < 0 is treated the same way as a couple with
both shocks positive. To relax these assumptions I re-estimate the model using
quantiles of [εx − εy]. If the difference in shocks is a cause of divorce, one would
expect a positive and significant coefficient for the upper and lower quantiles and
a zero coefficient for median points.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Always-married Currently-married
Female’s Education qualification
No qualification 23.62% 20.45%
O-level 21.54% 28.85%
A-level 10.9% 11.83%
Higher vocational 28.15% 27.8%
Univeristy degree 15.79% 11.06%
Male’s Education qualification
No qualification 19.99% 19.82%
O-level 16.06% 21.34%
A-level 12.43% 13.24%
Higher vocational 33.27% 31.25%
Univeristy degree 18.25% 14.36%
Race
White females 96.93% 96.68%
Black females 0.89% 1.29%
Other nonwhite females 2.72% 2.04%
White males 96.78% 96.23%
Black males 0.49% 1.64%
Other nonwhite males 2.73% 2.75%
London inhabitant 5.7% 6.9%
Female’s Avg working hours/week
less than 16 hours 14.49% 14.21%
between 16 to 30 hours 38.05% 36.79%
between 30 to 40 hours 42.25% 43.22%
More than 40 hours 5.2% 5.78%
Male’s Avg working hours/week
less than 16 hours 0.77% 0.54%
between 16 to 30 hours 3.98% 3.24%
between 30 to 40 hours 66.36% 63.3%
More than 40 hours 28.89% 32.92%
Average monthly labour income
Female’s 1066 1000
Male’s 2027 1858
Average age
Female’s 42 37
Male’s 44 38
Number of Dependent children
None 46.27% 27.79%
One 21% 25%
Two 24% 32%
Three or more 9% 15%
Housing Tenure
Owned outright 16.2% 6.47%
Owned with mortgage 70.57% 72.58%
In social housing 7% 13%
Privately rented 4% 6%
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Table 2.3: Probability of divorce based on squared residual differences
Probit Logit Clog-log RE Probit
[εx − εy]2 -0.00162 -0.00361 -0.00354 -0.00175
(-0.46) (-0.40) (-0.39) (-0.46)
Pres school children -0.170 -0.429 -0.424 -0.187
(-1.92) (-1.83) (-1.82) (-1.95)
Age (woman) 0.0165* 0.0439* 0.0434* 0.0201*
(2.21) (2.31) (2.32) (2.28)
Age (man) -0.0423*** -0.113*** -0.112*** -0.0467***
(-5.65) (-5.89) (-5.92) (-5.31)
Owns outright 0.137 0.404 0.404 0.145
(1.22) (1.30) (1.30) (1.17)
Woman’s education
O-level 0.188* 0.527* 0.525* 0.211*
(2.01) (2.09) (2.10) (1.97)
A-level -0.146 -0.378 -0.374 -0.163
(-1.01) (-0.94) (-0.93) (-1.03)
Some college 0.0507 0.160 0.161 0.0662
(0.50) (0.58) (0.58) (0.59)
University degree -0.146 -0.365 -0.360 -0.150
(-1.00) (-0.90) (-0.89) (-0.93)
Man’s education
O-level 0.0973 0.219 0.216 0.115
(0.97) (0.81) (0.80) (1.02)
A-level -0.0797 -0.196 -0.194 -0.0871
(-0.69) (-0.63) (-0.62) (-0.68)
Some college 0.0229 0.0500 0.0508 0.0348
(0.25) (0.20) (0.20) (0.34)
University degree -0.0759 -0.262 -0.261 -0.0788
(-0.57) (-0.69) (-0.69) (-0.54)
Living in London -0.0256 -0.0652 -0.0616 -0.0348
(-0.20) (-0.18) (-0.17) (-0.24)
Socio-economic class(women)
Intermediate white collar 0.0223 0.0907 0.0910 0.0208
(0.25) (0.38) (0.38) (0.21)
Independents (Petty bourgeoisie) -0.0777 -0.218 -0.218 -0.0916
(-0.71) (-0.72) (-0.72) (-0.76)
Intermediate blue collar 0.271 0.715 0.710 0.301
(1.81) (1.87) (1.88) (1.82)
Working class 0.128 0.358 0.355 0.137
(1.19) (1.25) (1.25) (1.16)
Socio-economic class(men)
Intermediate white collar -0.154 -0.396 -0.393 -0.180
(-1.04) (-0.99) (-0.98) (-1.09)
Independents (Petty bourgeoisie) 0.136 0.369 0.368 0.152
(1.37) (1.41) (1.41) (1.40)
Intermediate blue collar -0.0606 -0.144 -0.141 -0.0722
(-0.60) (-0.54) (-0.53) (-0.64)
Working class -0.182* -0.477* -0.470 -0.195*
(-2.06) (-1.97) (-1.96) (-2.02)
Black ethnic origin 0.537 1.361 1.341 0.566
(1.24) (1.31) (1.32) (1.20)
Woman’s avg working hrs per week 0.00653** 0.0179** 0.0177** 0.00731*
(2.60) (2.67) (2.67) (2.57)
Man’s avg working hrs per week -0.00232 -0.00631 -0.00626 -0.00268
(-0.74) (-0.75) (-0.75) (-0.79)
Constant -1.420*** -2.253*** -2.281*** -1.571***
(-5.48) (-3.37) (-3.45) (-5.11)
Logged Variance of R.E. -1.784**
(-2.86)
Number of observations 17683 17683 17683 17683
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Figure 2.2: Kernel estimate of female’s shock minus male’s shock
The estimates based on tercile, quintiles, and deciles of [εx − εy] with the middle
percentiles being the reference category are presented in Table 2.4. The set of
control variables is the same as specification 1. Figure provides the kernel density
estimates of [εx − εy]. None of the sepecifications discussed so far find the difference
in shocks as a determinant of divorce. In the next step I focus more on ranking
of partners according to their income shock. Suppose there are only two ex-post
types. i.e. x = {good, bad}, and
x =

good if εit ≥ 0
bad if εit < 0
The terminology for ranking couples in this way is borrowed from Burdett, Coles
1999 and Cornelius 2003. The types here merely indicates the sign of income
shocks. Assuming positive shocks are favourable, a partner who receifves a favourable
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income shock is referred to as a partner with good shock or simply a partner of
good type, likewise for negative shocks. Therefore, we have the following couple
types: 
G-G if εfit ≥ 0 and εmit ≥ 0
G-B if εfit ≥ 0 and εmit < 0
B-G if εfit < 0 and ε
m
it ≥ 0
B-B if εfit < 0 and ε
m
it < 0
Where εfit refers to women’s income shock at any wave and ε
m
it refers to men’s shock.
The first character in couple types indicates women’s residuals and the second
indicates their spouse’s residual. According to the predictions of the model G-G
and B-B Matches are more stable than B-G and G-B matches. The log-likelihood
function in (2.19) is estiamted again, using the couple types as covariates that
capture the degree of mismatch between partners.
As seen in Table 2.5 among couples with identical levels of education, socio-
economic class and average working hours per week, those who are in the B-B
group have the highest probability of divorce. The rate of divorce among B-B
couples is higher than G-B and B-G couples who are not matched with their own
type. The application of search theory to marriage market implies the cause of
divorce is re-sorting in order to rematch with someone’s own type. If that was
true, we should have observed higher divorce rates among G-B and B-G couples.
However, the findings in this chapter do not support the scenario that resorting is
a motivation for divorce.
The rest of the covariates are included in the model to gain robust estimates
of effect of difference in shocks and, therefore, are not the interest of this analysis
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Table 2.5: Couple’s type and Probability of Divorce
Probit Logit Clog-log RE Probit
Couple’s type
G-B 0.0740 0.175 0.173 0.0768
(0.88) (0.78) (0.78) (0.85)
B-G 0.103 0.298 0.295 0.112
(1.04) (1.10) (1.10) (1.06)
B-B 0.233* 0.590* 0.584* 0.242*
(2.22) (2.09) (2.09) (2.14)
Pres school children -0.174 -0.450 -0.447 -0.189*
(-1.96) (-1.91) (-1.91) (-1.99)
Age (woman) 0.0169* 0.0450* 0.0445* 0.0201*
(2.28) (2.38) (2.39) (2.33)
Age (man) -0.0425*** -0.114*** -0.113*** -0.0465***
(-5.68) (-5.91) (-5.96) (-5.34)
Owns outright 0.130 0.390 0.389 0.138
(1.15) (1.25) (1.26) (1.12)
Woman’s education
O-level 0.191* 0.525* 0.523* 0.212*
(2.06) (2.10) (2.11) (2.02)
A-level -0.143 -0.375 -0.371 -0.157
(-0.99) (-0.93) (-0.93) (-1.01)
Some college 0.0554 0.167 0.167 0.0697
(0.55) (0.61) (0.61) (0.63)
University degree -0.149 -0.372 -0.365 -0.152
(-1.03) (-0.92) (-0.91) (-0.95)
Man’s education
O-level 0.0984 0.218 0.214 0.114
(0.98) (0.80) (0.79) (1.03)
A-level -0.0738 -0.184 -0.181 -0.0791
(-0.64) (-0.59) (-0.58) (-0.63)
Some college 0.0309 0.0669 0.0670 0.0415
(0.33) (0.26) (0.26) (0.41)
University degree -0.0598 -0.228 -0.229 -0.0616
(-0.44) (-0.59) (-0.60) (-0.42)
Living in London -0.00474 -0.00793 -0.00519 -0.0124
(-0.04) (-0.02) (-0.01) (-0.09)
Socio-economic class(women)
Intermediate white collar 0.00939 0.0668 0.0687 0.00728
(0.11) (0.28) (0.29) (0.07)
Independents (Petty bourgeoisie) -0.136 -0.376 -0.373 -0.151
(-1.17) (-1.18) (-1.18) (-1.21)
Intermediate blue collar 0.241 0.636 0.633 0.267
(1.60) (1.65) (1.66) (1.62)
Working class 0.0779 0.216 0.213 0.0860
(0.70) (0.71) (0.71) (0.71)
Socio-economic class(women)
Intermediate white collar -0.173 -0.440 -0.435 -0.195
(-1.16) (-1.08) (-1.08) (-1.18)
Independents (Petty bourgeoisie) 0.0936 0.267 0.269 0.107
(0.90) (0.98) (0.99) (0.96)
Intermediate blue collar -0.0803 -0.179 -0.174 -0.0909
(-0.80) (-0.68) (-0.66) (-0.82)
Working class -0.209* -0.533* -0.526* -0.221*
(-2.38) (-2.23) (-2.21) (-2.31)
Black ethnic origin 0.526 1.320 1.299 0.555
(1.20) (1.25) (1.26) (1.17)
Woman’s avg working hrs per week 0.00827** 0.0225** 0.0223** 0.00907**
(3.08) (3.23) (3.24) (3.01)
Men’s avg working hrs per week -0.00218 -0.00630 -0.00629 -0.00249
(-0.72) (-0.78) (-0.78) (-0.76)
Constant -1.536*** -2.525*** -2.547*** -1.679***
(-5.88) (-3.78) (-3.86) (-5.44)
Logged Variance of R.E. -1.904**
(-2.83)
Number of observations 17683 17683 17683 17683
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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per se. Nevertheless, it can be seen that the socio-economic class of women does
not play any role in the probability of divorce. Working class men are less likely to
divorce compared with the salarist. The reference group for socio-economic class
are the salarists or service classes. Professionals, administrative and managerial
employees are in this group. Men’s average working hours per week does not
have an effect on divorce rate whereas longer working hours of women increase
the probability of divorce. Marital specific capitals, namely home ownership and
dependent children, do not have an effect on the probability of divorce. I controlled
for number of children in various ways, such as number of dependent children in
total, number of depenedent children at different age groups, the age of youngest
child. The overall result is that existence of children, at least among couples who
both are active in labour market, does not play a role in divorce probabilities.
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2.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Changing the cut off point of shocks
I conducted a few robustness checks for the results. As discussed in previous
sections, an agent will fall into a good category if her income shock is bigger than
or equal to zero. The ideal analysis will distinguish between those whose residual
is positive but close to zero and those whose residuals are at the extreme right
tail of the residual distribution. If having a positive shock is a proxy for relative
success in the labour market, then those with big positive shocks are relatively
very successful. On the other hand, someone with a negative shock close to zero
is considered as unsuccessful as an agent with a very negative shock furthesr from
zero. In other words, agents with shocks at minimal distance from zero can be
considered alike.
Unfortunately, the small sample size does not allow a fine division of shocks
into separate categories. I, however, have grouped those with a shock that is half
a standard deviation away from the mean into a new category called average. The
new type set is thus {good, average, bad} which results in 9 types of partnerships.
The partnership types set is {B-B, B-Avg, B-G, Avg-B, Avg-Avg, Avg-G, G-B,
G-Avg, G-G}. As before, the first character in the couple type pair indicates
women’s type of shock and the second character indicates the shock type of their
spouse. The probability of divorce is estimated using these 9 types and the results
are presented in Table 2.6.
The rest of the control variables not shown in Table 2.6 are the same as previous
specifications. According to the re-sorting theory, if we take B-B as the reference
group, probability of divorce among B-Avg, B-G, Avg-B, Avg-G, G-B and G-
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Avg must be higher than the reference category. This is due to the fact that
compared with B-B all those mentioned types are partnerships in which men and
women are not matched with their own type. However, first three columns of
Table 2.6, indicate the opposite. Compared with B-B group, the probability of
divorce among all other groups is lower. In specifications 4-6, the reference group
is Avg-B. As seen in Table 2.6, the highest probability is still observed among
B-B types. Specifications 7-9 confirm the findings. Depending on the reference
category, coefficient of B-B is significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 or 0.1 level.
A different measure of unstable marriages and Cloglog estimations
An unstable marriage is a marriage that is observed to end in separation or divorce.
The married couples can be divided into two groups: a group of unstable marriages
and a group of stable marriages. In the latter case, as long as the couple have
been surveyed they did not exit their partnership. Rather than estimating the
probability of divorce, the probability of belonging to one the two groups can be
estimated. Log-likelihood function is now defined in the following way:
Logθ =
n∑
i=1
[
MDiln
(
pr(MDi = 1|Xi)
)
+ (1−MDi)ln
(
pr(MDi = 0|Xi)
)]
Where MD denotes a marriage that ends in divorce. Replicating the assumption
of the model, income shocks are realised in the second period and couples adjust
their divorce strategies according to the realisation of their own and their partner’s
income shock. Thus defining the dependent variable as unstable marriage rather
than event of divorce should not change the results.
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It should be stressed again that the limited data at hand does not allow for du-
ration analysis. There is not enough information about the start of the marriages
of all the married, active in labour market couples who experience divorce. Cur-
rently, the number of marital dissolutions in the sample is about 8% which means
206 divorces or separations for 2354 households. After deriving the duration of
marriage for the existing couples, the number of divorces dropped by more than
half. Given that these couples are then grouped into 4 categories and the divorce
behaviour is compared across the four groups, there was not enough data points
to conduct a duration analysis.
Rather than estimating a hazard model I estimate equation (2.19) with com-
plementary log-log which capture asymmetry in dependent variable better than
logit and probit models. Clog-log coefficients are presented alongside probit and
logit coefficients in all the tables. Setting unstable marriage as dependent vari-
able increases the frequency of positive outcome in dependent variable. As seen in
Table 2.7, the final results remain robust under this specification.
2.5.3 Discussion
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether resorting is a valid expla-
nation for marital dissolution. The application of search and matching theory
with positive assortative matching to marriage market suggests that given set of
imperfect information at the time of marriage, once the match is formed and part-
ners learn about ex-ante unobservable characteristics they end their marriage if
the ex-post realised characteristics are not compatible. The option outside mar-
riage for those couples who don’t have similar characteristics, is separation and
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Figure 2.3: Joint distribution of couple’s income shocks
re-partnering with someone of their own type. Thus, divorce rate must be higher
among couples who are not matched with their like. This implication is tested
with a sample of British households between 1991 and 2008. I assumed that after
forming the partnerships, agents receive type shocks. These shocks are not ob-
servable at the time of marriage or else, with frictionless matching, agents would
have been sorted on the shock types in the first period as well. I estimate the type
shocks with the residuals of Mincer wage model.
Figure 2.3 presents a joint distribution of men and women residuals or said
otherwise the joint distribution of type shocks. It is clear from the dot plot in
Figure 2.3 , that these residuals are not correlated and, therefore, there is no
systematic sorting among couples with respect to the residuals.
Having the difference between residuals as a regressor to predict the probability
of divorce did not support the hypothesis that a mismatch between couples is the
driving force for divorce. To make the analysis clearer I ranked agents according
to the type of their shock. I consider positive shocks favourable because positive
shocks indicate earnings higher than average. Similarly, negative shocks are con-
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sidered unfavourable. Following these two type of shocks there are four types of
partnerships. Partnerships in which both partners have favourable or both have
unfavourable shocks are matching of likes. Partners with opposite shocks are mis-
matched. I then compared the divorce rate across these four groups and found
the matches when both partners have negative shocks to be most likely to break
down. The results are robust to various specifications and controls.
I have not found a similar study in the literature that empirically tests the pre-
dictions of on the match search models in marriage market. Nevertheless, there
is a number of studies that investigate the relationship between labour market
outcomes or shocks to earnings and quality of marriage. Weiss and Willis define
shocks according to permanent income. In their framework, each party forms an
expectation about their own and their partner’s lifetime income at the time of mar-
riage. These expectations are updated each period given a new set of information.
They define yearly income shocks as the difference between predicted permanent
(lifetime) income at the time of marriage and the predicted income evaluated after
each year of marriage. They find that an unexpected increase in the husband’s
earning capacity reduces the divorce hazard while an unexpected increase in the
wife’s earning capacity raises the divorce hazard. Up to the point that unexpected
decreases in husband’s earnings increases probability of divorce, their findings are
in line with my results. Regarding the positive correlation between wives income
shock and the probability of divorce, I only find such effect when I exclude a
number of control variables such as socio-economic class of husbands and wives.
In another strand of research, unemployment is considered as an unfavourable
shock and the effect of this shock on divorce rate is investigated. There is a vast
literature from different countries on this matter. To name a few, Jensen and
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Smith (1990) use sample of married couples in Denmark, between 1979 and 1985
and find that only the unemployment of the husband to have a negative effect on
marriage stability. Boheim and Ermisch (2001) find unexpected improvements in
finances to substantially reduce the risk of dissolution. They also find evidence
that the risk of breakdown is higher for couples who experience negative financial
surprises. Also, Blekesaune (2008), finds any form of unemployment to predict
partnership dissolution. He uses BHPS between 1991 to 2005. What can be learnt
from the studies that investigate effect of unemployment on divorce is that financial
constraints put pressure on marriages and increase the probability of dissolution.
In this sense, my findings are comparable with the mentioned studies as both
approaches predict adverse financial circumstances to increase the risk of divorce.
In the next chapter, I propose that one possible explanation for the higher rate of
divorce among financially less advantaged couples is their higher access to state
benefits.
2.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to investigate how effectively the search and
matching models, in particular on the match search models, are able to explain
the divorce behaviour among couples. I focused my analysis on couples where both
members are employed or self-employed and I used a sample of British Household
Panel Survey between 1991 and 2008 to estimate the probabilities of divorce. My
findings suggest that the application of on the match search to marriage market,
although theoretically convenient is not empirically supported. The decision to
divorce is not best explained by mismatch and motivation to find a better com-
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panion.
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Table 2.7: Probability of Unstable Marriage
Probit Logit Cloglog
Dependent variable: md md md
G-B 0.0661 0.127 0.0661
(1.02) (0.99) (1.02)
B-G 0.0825 0.155 0.0825
(1.19) (1.12) (1.19)
B-B 0.157* 0.305* 0.157*
(2.26) (2.24) (2.26)
Pres school children 0.0935 0.180 0.0935
(1.47) (1.47) (1.47)
Age (woman) 0.0183 0.0405 0.0183
(1.63) (1.79) (1.63)
Age (man) -0.0342** -0.0712** -0.0342**
(-3.10) (-3.23) (-3.10)
Owns outright -0.314* -0.667* -0.314*
(-2.52) (-2.41) (-2.52)
London inhabitant -0.0143 -0.0411 -0.0143
(-0.10) (-0.14) (-0.10)
Intermediate white collar 0.0955 0.199 0.0955
(1.30) (1.40) (1.30)
Independents (Petty bourgeoisie) -0.0671 -0.112 -0.0671
(-0.73) (-0.60) (-0.73)
Intermediate blue collar -0.0606 -0.0995 -0.0606
(-0.49) (-0.40) (-0.49)
Working class -0.0395 -0.0720 -0.0395
(-0.39) (-0.36) (-0.39)
Intermediate white collar 0.148 0.284 0.148
(1.29) (1.31) (1.29)
Independents (Petty bourgeoisie) 0.0336 0.0558 0.0336
(0.32) (0.26) (0.32)
Intermediate blue collar 0.122 0.233 0.122
(1.33) (1.32) (1.33)
Working class -0.0425 -0.0918 -0.0425
(-0.51) (-0.55) (-0.51)
Black ethnic origin 0.545 1.001 0.545
(1.54) (1.56) (1.54)
Woman’s avg working hrs per week 0.00364 0.00652 0.00364
(1.54) (1.37) (1.54)
Man’s avg working hrs per week 0.00309 0.00607 0.00309
(1.36) (1.30) (1.36)
Constant -1.090*** -1.835*** -1.090***
(-4.82) (-4.09) (-4.82)
Number of observations 16115 16115 16115
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Chapter 3
Benefit System and Marriage Dissolution
Among Working Families
3.1 Introduction
The traditional economic model of marriage implies that falling male earnings,
rising female earnings, and increasing public support for unmarried mothers will
generally reduce marriage rates and increase the prevalence of single-headed house-
holds (Becker, 1973, 1974). The previous chapter discussed that among married
men and women who both are active in labour market; the chance of separation
is highest for those couples that both spouses have earnings below the average of
their cohort. In this chapter I argue that a possible explanation for this observed
phenomenon is the availability of social benefits. Therefore I test to what extent
eligibility for more public support after divorce can explain the divorce decision
among working families, specifically families in which both partners have a below
average labour market productivity and thus are likely to be more economically
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disadvantaged.
In traditional families, women and children were financially dependent on men’s
earnings. With increased rate of employment among married mothers this depen-
dency has weakened but still is existent. Financial constraints can discourage
couples from separating even if the quality of their marriage is below expectation.
If the benefit system alleviates the financial difficulties following a divorce then
we can expect an increase in the probability of divorce among unhappily married
couples. The benefit system can improve the expected value of single-hood either
through an increase in non-labour income or through an increase in tax credits,
which effectively increases the real wages. Among married women who specialise
in home production, the financial insecurity in the case of divorce is higher given
their lack of marketable skills and experiences. Married women who are full time
or part time active in labour market, do not face the challenges of inactive women
for entering labour force upon divorce. However their challenge in splitting their
time between market and home production in case of divorce can create a bar-
rier for marital dissolution. Therefore availability of child care support, housing
benefit, and tax credits can smooth the transition from partnership to single-hood.
The benefit system can create an incentive for marital dissolution by providing
at least a partial level of financial security after divorce. Looking at receipt of ben-
efits after divorce to understand the effect of social benefits on marital dissolution
creates endogeneity (reverse causality) problem. A common practice to deal with
this endogeneity problem is to estimate the benefit entitlements using instruments
such as a tax simulator. With the help of the tax simulator, one can estimate
the counter factual, and study how benefit entitlements change if a couple were
to divorce. The difference in entitlements before and after divorce provides an
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estimate of the role of welfare system on marital dissolution.
This chapter focuses on families where both partners are active in labour market
and investigates whether the benefit system can provide an explanation for the
divorce patterns that have been observed among working families in chapter two.
In what follows, firstly I provide a review of the UK tax and benefit system during
1991 to 2008 and discuss how tax and benefit system can create incentives for
divorce. Section 3 describes the data set used for this study. Section 4 sets out
the empirical strategy, and explains use of the tax simulator to calculate counter
factual entitlement in case of divorce. Findings are presented in section 5, and
section 6 concludes.
3.2 Review of UK Tax-Benefit System from 1991 to 2008
The tax and benefit system in the UK is not marriage neutral 1. In their 2002
report (Civitas, 2002), The Institute for the Study of Civil Society (Civitas) point
out that welfare system has subsidised the lone parenthood which in turn discour-
ages parents to share the child care responsibility through marriage. Whether the
system is advantageous or disadvantageous to the society is beyond the scope of
this study. Nevertheless the Civitas’ discussion about marriage penalties created
by UK tax and benefit system is in line with the findings of this study.
Figure 3.1, illustrates how much total benefits entitlement of a married couple
changes if they were to divorce. Entitlements are calculated using the entitledto,
which is one of the major on-line benefit calculators in the UK. I picked two
families from the sample of this study- the sample will be described in details
1It is dependent on marital status.
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Figure 3.1: Two Examples Based on entitledto
Example	 1 Example	 2
.	 Both	 partners	 aged	 below	 50
.	 2	 dependent	 children	 under	 12
.	 Rent	 of	 private	 house	 £104	 per	 week
.	 No	 other	 income	 apart	 from	 wages	 
.	 Both	 partners	 aged	 below	 50
.	 2	 dependent	 children	 under	 12
.	 Rent	 of	 private	 house	 £265	 per	 week
.	 No	 other	 income	 apart	 from	 wages	 
Husband:
.	 Employed
.	 Works	 40	 hours	 per	 week
.	 Earns	 £270	 per	 week	 (£240	 after	 
deductions)
Husband:
.	 Self	 employed
.	 Works	 30	 hours	 or	 more	 per	 week
.	 Earns	 £120	 per	 week	 (Net	 of	 deductions)
Wife:	 
.	 Employed
.	 Works	 8	 hours	 per	 week	 
.	 Earns	 £84	 per	 week	 (£84	 after	 
deductions)
Wife:	 
.	 Employed
.	 Works	 below	 15	 hours	 per	 week	 
.	 Earns	 £81	 per	 week	 (Net	 of	 deductions)
Total	 benefits	 of	 the	 married	 couple:	 £154
-£112	 Child	 Tax	 Credit
-£8	 Housing	 Benefit
-£34	 Child	 Care	 Cost	 Benefit
Total	 benefits	 of	 the	 married	 couple:	 £154
-£107	 Child	 Tax	 Credit
-£254	 Housing	 Benefit
-£34	 Child	 Care	 Cost	 Benefit
Total	 benefits	 of	 the	 single	 mother	 assuming	 
her	 rent	 and	 wages	 remains	 as	 above:	 £278
-£116	 Child	 Tax	 Credit
-£24	 Council	 Tax	 Support
-£103	 Housing	 Benefit
-£34	 Child	 Care	 Cost	 Benefit
Total	 benefits	 of	 the	 single	 mother	 assuming	 
her	 rent	 and	 wages	 remains	 as	 above:	 £278
-£107	 Child	 Tax	 Credit
-£26	 Council	 Tax	 Support
-£265	 Housing	 Benefit
-£34	 Child	 Care	 Cost	 Benefit
Total	 benefits	 of	 the	 divorced	 husband,	 
assuming	 children	 stay	 with	 their	 mum,	 his	 
rent	 reduces	 to	 £80	 per	 week	 and	 his	 wage	 
remains	 as	 above:	 £0
Total	 benefits	 of	 the	 divorced	 husband,	 
assuming	 children	 stay	 with	 their	 mum,	 his	 
rent	 reduces	 to	 £150	 per	 week	 and	 his	 wage	 
remains	 as	 above:	 £152
-£52	 Working	 Tax	 Credit
-£99	 Housing	 Benefit
The	 difference	 in	 benefits	 between	 married	 
and	 divorced	 states:	 £124	 per	 week	 
The	 difference	 in	 benefits	 between	 married	 
and	 divorced	 states:	 £190	 per	 week	 
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in the following section-. In the two selected households, partners earn labour
income, they have dependent children under 12 years old and they live in privately
rented houses. As far as the data allowed I used actual numbers to obtain the
estimated benefits. As seen in Figure 3.1, the entitlement to benefits is greater if
the two partners claim for benefits as two divorcees and the gain is higher for the
couple with lower labour income.
Depending on the objective the the study, this difference is referred to in the
literature as bonus or penalty. The most commonly used term in the literature is
marriage penalty (as seen in Adam and Brewer (2010), Francesconi et al. (2009)).
Throughout this chapter I refer to this difference as divorce premium to stress the
importance of gain from social benefits caused by marital dissolution. Adam and
Brewer (2010) explain that the tax and benefit system will be completely marriage
neutral if all the taxes and benefits are assessed individually. They provide the
following causes for marriage penalties created by UK tax and benefit system:
• When the benefits are provided to adults with no income but will be taken
away for couples based on their combined income.
• The benefit cap for the couple is smaller than twice the cap for the single
adults. The benefit cap is usually applicable to means-tested benefits.
• Benefits are aimed to help families with certain living costs, such as housing
cost. In this case couples living together, who benefit from economies to
scale in living costs, face a couple penalty.
The tax and benefit system in the UK has undergone a number of reforms over
the past few decades. Given that the sample of this study covers years 1991 to
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Figure 3.2: A Brief Time line of Tax and Benefit Reforms 1991-2008
2008 I briefly review the major reforms that took place during this period and
discuss whether or not those reforms are marriage neutral. It should be noted that
since I am interested in working and married couples, I ignore the reforms aimed
at elderly people, sick and disabled people and bereaved people.
Figure 3.2 presents a time-line of the reforms that took place during the period
under investigation. Family Credit (FC) was in place from 1988 to 1999. Fam-
ily credit was a means-tested benefit designed to help families with low income.
Families with children needed to have at least one adult working at least 16 hours
per week to be eligible for this benefit. Household’s maximum credit consisted of
a basic adult rate, credits for each child and childcare credits if applicable. There
was a bonus for working 30 hours or more per week.
From 1999, Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) replaced FC and lasted until
2003. WFTC was a more generous in-work support compared with FC; it provided
more credits for younger children, increased the threshold of income eligibility and
decreased the tapper rate and increased the help with childcare costs. In the 1998
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HM treasury report, it is stated that one of the advantages of WFTC in principle
was improving work incentives by increasing potential in work benefits.
In April 2003 the WFTC was replaced by the Working Tax Credit and Child
Tax Credit. WTC and CTC are subject to joint means-test. WTC provides in
work support for families on low wages but no employment conditions are required
to be eligible for CTC. The new feature of WTC was that families without children
could also claim WTC conditional on having at least one adult working 30 hours
or more per week. The CTC separated out the child premium that was provided
under WFTC and merged it with the child premium provided under the income
support (IS) programme. CTC replaced Children’s Tax Credit in 2003. Children’s
Tax credit existed for a short period of time from 2001 to 2003 and it was not
based on family’s income. The Children’s tax credit was introduced to increase the
amount of help that goes to families with children regardless of their marital status.
Prior to Children’s tax credit, married couples and single or married parents were
entitled to married couple’s allowance (MCA) and an additional personal allowance
(APA), respectively. Overall the welfare system progressed towards a system more
considerate about children’s right (Ridge, 2003).
The Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) replaced the previous system of Unemploy-
ment Benefit and Income Support in 1996. JSA has two components, Contributory
and Income-based. JSA was intended to promote finding job among the unem-
ployed and is different from previous system in two main aspects; The duration of
Contributory JSA which replaced the Unemployment Benefit was reduced from one
year to six months and the claimants were required to sign a job seeker’s agreement
in which they agree to actively look for work (Manning (2009), Petrongolo (2009)).
Only one partner in a couple can claim income-based JSA, and the partner of the
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claimant cannot be working more than 24 hours per week (James Browne (2012)).
Having reviewed the reforms and pointing out the general purpose of each we
can now look at the the potential sources of marital penalties created by these
reforms. The two key personal income taxes in the UK are income tax and Na-
tional Insurance contributions. Independent taxation was introduced in 1990, after
which people have been taxed as individual persons. A fully individual taxation is
marriage neutral. Until 1990, the income of a married woman was regarded as her
husband’s for tax purposes. In an attempt to establish a system that treats men
and women neutrally it was suggested to move towards a system of transferable
allowances. In 1990 a reform took place to tax husbands and wives separately,
based on their individual income.
The new system allowed transfer of any unconsumed personal allowances be-
tween spouses, regardless of their gender. In addition to the personal allowance
that were common to all individuals, married couples and non married divorced or
widowed parents could claim married couple’s allowance (MCA) or additional per-
sonal allowance (APA), respectively. Given that the MCA and APA were equal in
value, they were not a source marriage penalty among married or divorced parents,
but childless couples would face marriage penalty. Although the new income tax
reform was designed to be gender neutral, effectively the transferable allowances
were creating disincentive for women to work. The system created many debates
and went under two additional reforms in 1994 and 1999. In 1994 reform, MCA
and APA were reduced to a flat rate of 20%. They were further reduced to 10%
in 1999 and ultimately abolished by 2000 (Parliament briefings SN/BT/315 and
SN4392 Seely (2009),Seely (2014)).
The tax credits summarised in 3.1, all depend on joint household income. Thus
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Table 3.1: Marriage Neutrality of Tax Benefit System during 1991-2008
Tax Credit/Benefit Effective Period Marriage Neutral
National Insurance Effective during 1991-2008.
Changes to the upper limit
Yes - Paid by em-
ployee if income in-
creases a certain level.
Income Tax Effective during 1991-2008.
Major reforms took place
during this period
Not until 2000.
Child Benefit Effective during the whole
period (1991-2008)
Yes - Independent of
marital status or in-
come of parents.
Family Credit Effective until 1999 No- means tested
Working Family Tax Credit From 1999 to 2003 No- means tested
Working Tax Credit 2003 onwards No- means tested
Child Tax Credit 2003 onwards No- means tested
Income Support Migrated to JSA in 2006
and went through some re-
forms.
No- means tested
Housing Benefit Effective during the whole
period (1991-2008)
No- means tested
Council Tax Benefit 1990-1993 No- means tested
Community Charge Benefit 1993 onwards No- means tested
they can be source of marriage penalties if the married couple’s joint income ex-
ceeds the threshold above which the family element is withdrawn. Council Tax
Benefit and Community Charge Benefit also depend on household income, and in
the case of married couples the household income is assessed as the joint income
of both partners.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this study are taken from BHPS. I use all the 18 waves of this
annually repeated survey which has been conducted from 1991 to 2008. The sample
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consists of married couples where both spouses are active in labour market, even
if their labour supply is as low as 5 hours per week, and are aged 23 to 59. Thus
for a couple to be part of the analysis both husband and wife should have a report
of their earned labour income. Both men and women remain in the sample up
to one year after divorce or separation. Therefore their characteristics during the
time that their marital status is changed to separated or divorced is accounted
for. Given this selection criteria, the sample size consists of 17000 observations for
2700 households.
Demographic characteristics of the sample are presented in table 3.2. For the
sake of statistical comparison I included those households in which either of the
partners may not be working. The summary statistics indicate that there is no
difference in employment rate among married men, whether they have dependent
children present in their household or not. The percentage of economic inactivity
among married women with dependent children is around 15% higher compared
with married women without a dependent child.
There is no systematic gender difference in educational qualification among
men and women with or without children. Couples with dependent child are on
average 4 to 5 years younger than childless couples. Couples with dependent child
have lower income and this difference is persistent even after rescaling the income
for the family size. The rescaling factor is the household equivalence scale before
housing costs, provided in BHPS. Households with dependent children, on average
have more access to benefit income.
The socio-economic class is defined based on a class specification that is com-
mon between Goldthorpe schema and the NS-SEC as seen in Goldthorpe and
McKnight (2006). These classifications are presented in table 3.3. Looking at
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
With Children Without Child
Number of Dependent Children
One 39% -
Two 43% -
Three or more 18% -
Economic activity
Male:
Working (employed/self employed) 95% 93%
Fmaily Care 1% less than 1%
Other 4% 7%
Female:
Working (employed/self employed) 71% 85%
Fmaily Care 23% 8%
Other 6% 7%
Education
Male:
No qualification/less than O level 18% 19%
O level/GCSE 19% 15%
A level 13% 13%
1emHigher vocational qualification 31% 34%
University degree 19% 19%
Female:
No qualification/less than O level 20% 25%
O level/GCSE 25% 19%
A level 12% 11%
Higher vocational qualification 29% 28%
University degree 16% 17%
Average weekly hours of work
Male 32(19) 28(20)
Female 18(15) 27(16)
Age
Male 39 (7) 43 (11)
Female 37(7) 44(11)
Household level Incomes
Annual Labour Income 28611(23667) 32631(23384)
Annual Non labour Income 3956(6445) 3396(7322)
Annual Benefit Income 2590(3717) 833 (3452)
Monthly Equvalised Income 2078(1517) 2802(1890)
Socio Economic Class
Male
Salarist 46% 45%
Intermediate white collar 5% 5%
Independents 15% 14%
Intermediate blue collar 11% 9%
Working class 24% 26%
Female
Salarist 37% 44%
Intermediate white collar 23% 23%
Independents 22% 16%
Intermediate blue collar 3% 3%
Working class 15% 13%
Sample Size 21114 (46%) 24737 (54%)
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summary statistics of table 3.2, it is evident that there is no difference in socio
economic class of men with or without children. Childless women are more likely
to be small employers or self-employed compared to married women with depen-
dent children. Moreover having children is observed to be associated with fewer
hours of work among women, whereas for men the opposite is true.
Table 3.3: Combined Goldthorpe schema and the NS-SEC
Salariat (or service class) Higher and lower grade profes-
sional, administrative and man-
agerial employees; higher grade
technicians
Intermediate white-collar Routine non-manual employees,
higher grade
Independents Small employers and self-
employed workers
Intermediate blue-collar Supervisors of manual workers,
lower grade technicians
Working class Skilled manual worker; Routine
non-manual workers; Semi and
unskilled manual workers
3.4 Methodology
3.4.1 Calculation of Marriage Penalties
As mentioned in the introduction, to answer the question of whether the welfare
system plays any role in marital dissolution one needs to deal with endogeneity
of dissolution decisions. Using benefit entitlements after divorce as a predictor
of divorce ignores the selection problem. With the help of a tax simulator it is
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possible to impute the counter-factual effect of divorce on benefit entitlement and
use this imputed estimator as an explanatory variable for divorce decision.
As Becker et al (1977) discuss, the probability of divorce depends on expected
gain and the variance of unanticipated gains from marriage. Following this argu-
ment, we should expect higher divorce rates if benefit system creates higher gain
after marital dissolution. Dickert-Conlin (1999) and Fisher (2013) are examples of
research on the effect of marriage penalties on marital status. The two mentioned
studies are based on the U.S. welfare system. A similar research based on UK wel-
fare system is the work of Adam and Brewer (2010), in which they analyse sources
of couple penalties and premiums under 2010-2011 UK tax and benefit system.
They don’t however relate couple penalties to marital dissolution decisions. The
effect of couple penalties on household formation is mostly studied under a single
policy evaluation such as Francesconi et al. (2009). Although they are primarily
interested in the impact of WFTC on work incentives, they provide a detailed
discussion on how the reform can impact divorce.
The usefulness of focusing on one policy is the possibility of finding a relibale
evidence for the analysis of causal effect of the policy on the event of interest.
However focusing on one policy limits the analysis to one period and more impor-
tantly to either a tex credit reform or a benefit reform. Rather than exploiting a
causal effect, this chapter is concerned with average association between marriage
penalties and probability of divorce. There seems to be a gap in the literature
regarding the combined effect of UK benefit and income tax system on marital
dissolutions. Anderberg (2008) studies the impact of WFTC, WTC and CTC
reforms on partnership rates. He is interested in the effect of welfare system on
the probability of having a partner but his main focus is on the three mentioned
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reforms that took place during 1999 and 2003.
I calculate divorce premiums for the working couples in my sample using a mi-
crosimulation tax library called FORTAX that implements the UK tax and benefit
system from 1990 to 2010. The other two tax-benefit microsimulation models ap-
plicable to UK system are EUROMOD and TAXBEN. EUROMOD is not limited
to UK system, however it is limited to specific data sources and the available data
source for UK that is compatible with EUROMOD starts from 2005. TAXBEN
is another simulator designed by Institute for Fiscal Studies for UK system since
1983, however it is not open to public use. FORTAX performs many of the same
functions as TAXBEN (Adam and Brewer, 2010). All of the reforms summarised
in table 3.1 are modelled by FORTAX. To estimate the difference in benefit en-
titlements before and after divorce, I need to simulate a divorce among married
couples. To simplify the analysis a few assumptions must be made regarding tax
liabilities of married couple if they separate. I assume the following hold after a
married couple separate:
1. Children will live with their mother after separation.
2. labour supply of both partners remains unchanged.
3. Housing tenure remains unchanged unless the couple were renting. In the
case of renters, the rent paid by single mothers remains at the same level
prior to divorce and the rent paid by separated men is halved.
4. There is 100% participation in both tax payment and benefit receipts.
5. Alimony payments are ignored.
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Most of these assumptions are derived from previous work in this literature.
Assumption (1) is the same as seen in Dickert-Conlin (1999), Eissa and Hoynes
(2000b), Adam and Brewer (2010), and Fisher (2013). The basis of this assump-
tion is the observed behaviour of splitting couples where in the majority of cases
(dependent) children if any, stay with their mother after a marital dissolution.
The second assumption of no change in labour supply, though may be un-
realistic, but helps to isolate the effect of a change in marital status on benefit
entitlements. Taking into account the change in labour supply following separa-
tion is not only technically complicated, but has the disadvantage that will not
allow disentangling the effect of merely a change in marital status on marriage
penalties. The second assumption is commonly made in the literature and can be
seen in Dickert-Conlin (1999), Adam and Brewer (2010), and Fisher (2013). Al-
though Fisher (2013) only points out that the actual earnings rather than labour
supplies are assumed to remain constant following a separation.
The third assumption has the same benefit as the second one in helping to
isolate the effect of change in marital status on divorce premiums. I have adopted
an approach somewhat similar to Adam and Brewer (2010) where they assume that
the housing cost of a single household is at least half those of the couple’s. With
the help of a Propensity Score Matching technique and comparing households
of similar characteristics, one can obtain a more precise way of predicting the
housing costs of both partners in the case of divorce. Applying the Propensity
Score Matching technique in this case implies generating hypothetical couples.
Given that the interest of this chapter is to explore how the benefit entitlements
coupled with a measurement of mismatch (as discussed in previous chapter) can
predict probability of divorce, I will use the simplistic assumption that the housing
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cost of renters will be halved for the partner who forms a single household following
the divorce and remains the same for the partner who lives with children. The
major drawback of this assumption is that it takes for granted that the housing
cost of home owners remains unchanged. Given that owning a house requires a
secure level of income, this assumption can be justified by arguing that the home
owners who benefit from higher levels of household income are less likely to be
eligible for housing benefits even if they separate.
The forth and fifth assumptions are embeded in FORTAX calculations and
their only purpose is to make the calculations tractable.
The net divorce premium for each couple is then defined as: ∆Pi = (P
f
i +P
m
i )−
P ci . Where P
f
i and P
m
i are net benefits that the man and woman are separately
entitled to and P ci denotes couple’s net benefit entitlement. The net benefits are
defined as the following:
• Net benefits = Total Benefits - total taxes.
• Total Benefits = child benefit + poll tax benefit + council tax benefit +
family care + working family tax credit + child tax credit + income support
+ housing benefit
• Total taxes = National insurance + income tax + council tax + poll tax
3.4.2 Empirical Strategy
The calculated divorce premiums are used as the main regressor in a reduced form
model to estimate the probability of marital dissolution. Analysis of the findings
are based on random effect probit estimation, however the results are robust to
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the choice of non-linear functional form (such as logit or c-log-log). The vector
of covariates includes the measure of positive assortative sorting between couples
which has been discussed in the previous chapter. At first I only look at the effect
of divorce premium generated by welfare system on the probability of divorce and
the effect of sorting will be added to the discussion shortly.
Pr(Dit) = f(Xit,∆Pit, ηit)
Where Pr(Dit) is the probability of divorce for each household at each point
in time. Xit is the vector of observable heterogeneity at individual and household
level; this includes age, education, socio economic class, housing tenure, average
hours of work per week, number of children and race. ∆Pit is the measure of
divorce premium which itself is a function of childcare expenditure, number of
dependent children in the household, housing tenure type, rent, region, council
tax band, interview date, both spouses’ age and earnings and a dummy for self
employment. ηit indicates the four couple types discussed in chapter two which are
functions of age, education, age at time of leaving full time education, time and
region fixed effects. The set of variables used to define Pr(Dit) is different from the
sets that define ηit and ∆Pit. This makes sure that the effect of divorce premium
on divorce probability is not merely stemming from a nonlinear relationship among
variables in the set of of Xit and ηit.
3.5 Findings
3.5.1 Main Results
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Estimations of effect of divorce premium on partnership dissolution are pre-
sented in Table 3.4. The dependent variable equals 1 if a marriage terminates
in separation or divorce. Table 3.4 presents estimation of the model firstly with
pooled probit and logit functions along with probit marginal effects. To take into
account the time dimension of the data and control for serial correlation the model
is then estimated using a random effect probit model with clustered standard er-
rors at individual level. The final column of table 3.4 presents the marginal effects
from random effect probit estimation. A more accurate method of estimating the
divorce probabilities would be by descrete hazard function that conditions the
probability of failure, in this case divorce, on survival rate and takes into account
the duration of survival. Unfortunately the lack of data does not allow calculation
of marriage durations which are an essential component of hazard function analy-
sis. In order to calculate accurate marriage durations I a considerable proportion
of the sample would be lost and given the currenlty limited cases of observed di-
vorce I refrain from using duration analysis at this stage. However this study can
be enriched by using the recently published data of British Household survey (Un-
derstanding the Society survey). With a bigger sample size one can have richer
data set without compromising the size of the sample.
Divorce premium is found to have significant but small effect on probability of
divorce in all the specifications. Models 1 to 3, show the effect of divorce premium
on marital dissolution without controlling for observable characteristics. A unit
increase in the premium is associated with 0.0000460 increase in probability of
divorce or 0.0046 percentage points increase. The premium is expressed in pound
sterling. Thus a unit increase in premium means one pound more of weekly transfer
to the household. Given the observed divorce rate of 5% in the data, £100 weekly
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increase in premium increases the probability of divorce by around 1%.
Specifications 4 to 12 include controls for observable heterogeneity. Columns
5 to 7 present the results controlling for age of both partners, the presence of
dependent children in the household, whether the couple live in London, race and
housing tenure. The housing tenures presented in the table are compared with
private renting. In specifications 7 to 9 education, socio economic class and average
working hours per week of both partners are controlled for. Adding these controls
has a slight effect on the estimated coefficient of interest i.e. divorce premium.
The additional controls increase the effect of premium on probability of sepa-
ration to 1.5%. In the last three specifications equivalised labour income is also
included in the model. The use of random effect models does not increase the
magnitude of the effect of premium and as it can be seen from the last column
of table 3.4, the random effect estimates suggest a similar measure of effect of di-
vorce premium on the likelihood of divorce. The closest evidence in the literature
to these findings is found in Anderberg (2008). However Anderberg (2008) finds a
stronger effect for premium. He reports that £100 per week of partnership penalty
reduces the probability of having a partner for women by about 7% percentage
points .
Anderberg’s measures of labour supply are more adjusted to the marital status.
He imputes the counterfactual labour supply of women by artificially matching all
the women in the sample with a potential partner. Given that with the current
benefit system working more hours per week makes a person entitled to more
generous benefits or tax reductions, allowing the labour supply to be flexible with
the changes in marital status could potentially increase the magnitude of divorce
premiums which could in turn increase their effect on probability of divorce.
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3.5.2 Results by Partnership Heterogeneity
As discussed in chapter 2, I assumed that the only dimension of assortative sorting
among spouses is their labour market productivity. After the marriage is formed
people receive productivity shocks. According to prediction of on the match search
literature, if the productivity shocks of the spouses are different then they have
a higher motivation for divorce, as they can be rematched with a new partner
similar to their type. Being matched with one’s own type yields higher payoffs as
the household production is an increasing function of both partner’s productivities.
The empirical test conducted in previous chapter did not find enough supportive
evidence for this theoretical prediction. In what follows, I test to what extent
the observed separation rate among married couples with low productivity can be
explained with divorce premiums generated by welfare system.
As seen in the previous chapter, partnerships in which both spouses are low
productive type are more prone to dissolution. By grouping agents into high and
low productivity type and I defined four types of partnerships according to relative
productivity of males and females. I replicate those types below:
• GG; if both female and male partner is of high productivity type
• GB; if female is high and male is low productivity type
• BG; if female is low and male is high productivity type
• BB; if both the female and male partner is of low productivity type
Given that productivities determine household income, BB couples are financially
worse off compared with the other three groups. The average monthly labour in-
come of four partnership types depicted in Figure 3.3 indicates that BB couples
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Figure 3.3: Household Income by Couple Type
have lower labour income compared with three other groups. The left hand side
graph in Figure 3.3 depicts that BB group have the lowest post tax weekly dispos-
able income. The right hand side graph verifies similar trend based on equivalised
annual labour income These trends are observed from 1991 to 2008, in the graphs
x-axis indicates the number of years throughout this period.
Additionally, given that most of the benefits in the UK are means tested,
households with lower income might have access to more benefit when they divorce.
This is depicted in Figure 3.4. It can be observed that divorce premium is higher
among households at lowest quantiles of labour income. Thus families with lower
income level have more to gain from benefit transfers if they separate.
According to the assumptions made earlier, children will reside with their
mother in case their parents separate. Thus it would be interesting to know
whether the benefit system provides more support to women after divorce, es-
pecially if they have dependent children. The first graph in Figure 3.5 depicts the
distribution of weekly divorce premiums by female’s type. From this graph we
can observe that should a high productivity woman divorce, she has less access to
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Figure 3.4: Divorce Premium by Income Quantiles
Figure 3.5: Divorce Premium for Women
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benefits than a low productivity type woman.
The second graph of figure 3.5 separates the distribution of weekly premiums of
high and low type women in the presence of dependent children in the household.
High type women gain less support from welfare system if they separate. Separated
with children earn more from benefit transfers than separated childless women.
Single mothers with low income have the highest gain from welfare system after
separation.
In all the graphs that depict divorce premium, a shift in the divorce premium
is observed at about wave 9. Wave 9 refers to calendar year 1999 which coincides
with the introduction of WFTC. Looking at bottom graph in figure 5, the average
premium for a good type woman has been around £10 per week from 1991 to 1999.
After the implementation of WFTC the average gain increased to about £25 per
week and has not decreased since then. The same holds for bad type women. Dis-
tinguishing between single mothers and divorced women without dependent child,
it seems that the benefit entitlement of childless women remains unchanged after
divorce throughout all the 18 waves of the panel, whereas women with dependent
children experience the rise in benefit after WFTC was introduced.
Following the discussion made at the end of chapter 2, it is interesting to inves-
tigate whether benefit system increases the gain from divorce for the BB couples
and hence explains the observed higher separation rate among these couples. This
exercise is done by adding the divorce premium as an explanatory variable to the
probability of divorce model and check how the inclusion of this factor in the model
affects the magnitude and significance of coefficients of productivity types.
Table 3.5 presents the estimated effect of benefit system when the couple type
is controlled for. The first column of Table 3.5, shows the effect of couple type
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Table 3.5: Estimated Probability of Divorce
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probit Marginal Effect Logit Probit Marginal Effect Logit RE Probit Marginal Effect
Divorce premium 0.00266*** 0.0000672*** 0.00706*** 0.0036*** 0.000035*
(3.44) (3.32) (3.71) (3.29) (2.47)
Couple’s Type
G-B 0.0134 0.000297 0.0223 0.0134 0.000312 0.0229 0.0083 0.00007
(0.15) (0.15) (0.10) (0.15) (0.15) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
B-G 0.150 0.00388 0.392 0.0689 0.00170 0.165 0.095 0.0009
(1.65) (1.53) (1.63) (0.72) (0.69) (0.65) (0.81) (0.73)
B-B 0.201* 0.00550* 0.500* 0.166* 0.00455 0.385 0.18 0.002
(2.48) (2.20) (2.33) (2.02) (1.84) (1.79) (1.75) (1.34)
Dependent Child -0.180 -0.00458 -0.424 -0.239* -0.00604* -0.583* -0.318** -0.003*
(-1.87) (-1.85) (-1.71) (-2.45) (-2.41) (-2.33) (-2.51) (-1.96)
Age (wife) 0.00816 0.000207 0.0193 0.00846 0.000214 0.0204 0.018 0.0001
(1.00) (1.00) (0.95) (1.03) (1.02) (0.98) (1.42) (1.61)
Age (Husband) -0.0406*** -0.00103*** -0.100*** -0.0406*** -0.00103*** -0.101*** -0.055*** -0.0005***
(-4.86) (-4.54) (-4.84) (-4.81) (-4.51) (-4.81) (-3.97) )(-2.71)
Housing Tenure
Own outright -0.434** -0.0251* -0.886* -0.421* -0.0249* -0.888* -0.588** -0.019*
(-2.64) (-2.40) (-2.07) (-2.55) (-2.35) (-2.09) (-2.40) (-2.14)
Own with mortgage -0.717*** -0.0331*** -1.628*** -0.730*** -0.0338*** -1.682*** -1.00*** -0.023**
(-5.95) (-3.53) (-5.70) (-6.03) (-3.58) (-5.88) (-4.51) (-2.69)
Council Housing -0.361* -0.0222* -0.779* -0.386* -0.0235* -0.862* -0.577* -0.019*
(-2.21) (-2.11) (-2.00) (-2.35) (-2.23) (-2.21) (-2.27) (-2.20)
London -0.0294 -0.000748 0.0183 0.000685 0.0000173 0.104 -0.023 -0.0002
(-0.20) (-0.20) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.27) (0.90) (-0.12)
Black ethnicity 0.736 0.0187 1.725 0.740 0.0187 1.759 0.894 0.008
(1.51) (1.50) (1.56) (1.53) (1.52) (1.60) (1.42) (1.25)
Constant -0.361 0.127 -0.358 0.190 -0.45
(-1.12) (0.17) (-1.09) (0.24) (-1.04)
Education dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-economic class dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average weekly hours Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household labour income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 13640 13640 13640 13640 13640 13640 13640
t-statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
on probability of divorce. This is replicated from the previous chapter to make
the comparison more tractable. It has already been discussed that being in a
BB couple significantly increases the probability of divorce compared with being
in a GG couple. According to pooled probit specification, inclusion of divorce
premium in the model decreases the coefficient of BB from 0.2 to 0.16. In the logit
specification, including divorce premiums wipes out the effect of couple type and
makes the coefficient of BB insignificant. The last two columns are estimations
using a random effect probit which acknowledges the possible serial correlation of
error term across observed waves. The RE probit estimation gives similar result
to that of logit specification and it is observed that after inclusion of divorce
premium couple type does not have a significant marginal effect on probability
of divorce. According to this observation, divorce premium can at least to some
extent explain the difference in separation rate among the four couple types. This
result can suggest that under the setting and assumptions of this paper, access
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to benefits transfers after divorce rather provides a better explanation for marital
dissolution compared with the motivation for re-sorting.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter explored how and to what extent the welfare system in the UK
generates incentives for marital dissolution. This has been done by looking at a
sample of around 3000 households in the UK, most of which are married and are
active in labour market. For the existing married couples a separation has been
simulated and with the help of a tax and benefit calculator the tax or benefit
entitlements of these couples is calculated before and after divorce. This difference
is then used as an explanatory variable to predict the probability of divorce. My
findings suggest that £100 weekly increase in premium increases the probability of
divorce by around 5%. Furthermore, a measure of assortative matching based on
spouse’s productivity is introduced to the model and it is observed that couples
with both spouses at lower levels of productivity are most likely to separate. This
can be explained partly by the availability of benefits to these couples in case they
divorce.
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